Why I don't think there are "Xinjiang atrocities"?

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Mikah
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22 Jun 2022, 3:58 pm

SkinnedWolf wrote:
For example, there has never been a "Tiananmen Massacre".
None of the students in Tiananmen Square died - and this undermined the student leader's plan.


Stepping on landmines here, so ingrained is the Tiananmen student massacre legend. I got banned on another unnamed site for suggesting the CCP might not have mowed down peacefully protesting students. I linked this:
https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_new ... nanmen.php
A reputable journalist from a reputable paper publishing in a reputable journal who was actually there covering the protests... is not enough to even put a seed of doubt in most minds.

Over the last decade, many American reporters and editors have accepted a mythical version of that warm, bloody night. They repeated it often before and during Clinton’s trip. On the day the president arrived in Beijing, a Baltimore Sun headline (June 27, page 1A) referred to “Tiananmen, where Chinese students died.” A USA Today article (June 26, page 7A) called Tiananmen the place “where pro-democracy demonstrators were gunned down.” The Wall Street Journal (June 26, page A10) described “the Tiananmen Square massacre” where armed troops ordered to clear demonstrators from the square killed “hundreds or more.” The New York Post (June 25, page 22) said the square was “the site of the student slaughter.”

The problem is this: as far as can be determined from the available evidence, no one died that night in Tiananmen Square.

A few people may have been killed by random shooting on streets near the square, but all verified eyewitness accounts say that the students who remained in the square when troops arrived were allowed to leave peacefully. Hundreds of people, most of them workers and passersby, did die that night, but in a different place and under different circumstances.

The Chinese government estimates more than 300 fatalities. Western estimates are somewhat higher. Many victims were shot by soldiers on stretches of Changan Jie, the Avenue of Eternal Peace, about a mile west of the square, and in scattered confrontations in other parts of the city, where, it should be added, a few soldiers were beaten or burned to death by angry workers.

The resilient tale of an early morning Tiananmen massacre stems from several false eyewitness accounts in the confused hours and days after the crackdown. Human rights experts George Black and Robin Munro, both outspoken critics of the Chinese government, trace many of the rumor’s roots in their 1993 book, Black Hands of Beijing: Lives of Defiance in China’s Democracy Movement. Probably the most widely disseminated account appeared first in the Hong Kong press: a Qinghua University student described machine guns mowing down students in front of the Monument to the People’s Heroes in the middle of the square. The New York Times gave this version prominent display on June 12, just a week after the event, but no evidence was ever found to confirm the account or verify the existence of the alleged witness. Times reporter Nicholas Kristof challenged the report the next day, in an article that ran on the bottom of an inside page; the myth lived on. Student leader Wu’er Kaixi said he had seen 200 students cut down by gunfire, but it was later proven that he left the square several hours before the events he described allegedly occurred.

Most of the hundreds of foreign journalists that night, including me, were in other parts of the city or were removed from the square so that they could not witness the final chapter of the student story. Those who tried to remain close filed dramatic accounts that, in some cases, buttressed the myth of a student massacre.

...


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23 Jun 2022, 8:15 am

^Thank you for your information. I hope I don't have to quote more third-party eyewitness reports to prove something that should have been common sense.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/89BEIJING18828_a.html

The weird thing about this is that many Westerners believe that the Chinese don't know what's going on around them - younger people may not care. But for the previous generation, 1989 was a nationwide protest, not just in Beijing or Tiananmen Square. (most of them are peaceful, although sometimes they may cause trouble to others. But a few are not. One of the soldiers who was tortured to death by lynching was younger than those college students, almost a child.)
At that time, many domestic media were following and reporting these events, and obviously held a sympathetic attitude towards the protesters.

Now many parents and teachers will openly teach these things to the new generation. And there are many views on this event. (the existence itself is simply mentioned in the University's political textbooks, but how to introduce it depends on the professor.)


There are many real participants in the Tiananmen Square protests, telling others about their experiences and complaining about their presence on the circulated "death list". Some of them have changed their political positions, while others have not.
The famous political prisoner, Yefu, was arrested in 1989 as a policeman to help student leaders leave China. He later became a businessman, activist and writer. He himself is a friend of my family. He is still free to spread his views in China. The only special treatment he received was that the official main media avoided quoting his works. He even has close relations with some local senior officials.



I would say that this is a hijacked movement. It confuses democracy with "democracy". Its success would bring disaster. (well informed Hong Kong people have exactly the same comments on what happened in 2019)
She is the most famous one. But this mentality is not isolated. This faction is another faction with which we have been fighting for a long time besides the pro establishment faction. (ironically, both factions often try to confuse us with each other.)

The chain of suspicion breaks trust. The damage it did to the hopes of all genuine democratic movements to carry out and formally negotiate with the government was permanent.

Mikah wrote:
Stepping on landmines here, so ingrained is the Tiananmen student massacre legend. I got banned on another unnamed site for suggesting the CCP might not have mowed down peacefully protesting students.

It is clear that both sides are blocking the discussion/dissent.
However, the difference is that the CCP is more weak and naive in this matter (considering the financial resources and the time they actually carry out these things), while the other party is more experienced and cunning.
(however, the real parties are very easy to expose them. Therefore, it is the consensus of Chinese netizens to "cross the firewall and become more patriotic")


On the other hand, the official speaks insincerely, and the people refuse to believe and are indifferent to the official news, but they are more concerned about whether the government has guaranteed their own lives. This is a cultural tradition of China (not the PRC) for thousands of years. This dynamic is not limited to people and governments.
It is different, but not necessarily inferior. The best condition may be some kind of improved mixture.


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23 Jun 2022, 3:56 pm

But remember, in the west we have a free and open media that will always hold our leadership accountable and always ensure we're well informed with the truth. They would never mislead us about something as serious as this in pursuit of a political agenda.


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24 Jul 2022, 2:49 pm

It is said to be quoted from The ETIM : China's Islamic militants and the global terrorist threat / J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke.

Quote:
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many Uyghur activists refuse to call the territory XUAR (“Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”) or even just “Xinjiang” because they consider the term a relic of Chinese imperialism… “we have (always) considered these names illegal and have never admitted and will never admit to them,” wrote Hashir Wahidi in an article posted on the Uyghur American Association’s website. (Wahidi founded the Uyghur Liberation Organization, a group accused of murder, kidnapping, and arson; he died in 1998, allegedly from injuries inflicted by unidentified intruders who beat him in his home in Kazakhstan).

Both violent and nonviolent Uyghur activists struggle with the choice between “Uyghuristan” and “East Turkistan.” This debate was one of the many dividing the members of Hashir Wahidi’s Uyghur Liberation Organization… In general, Uyghur activists from northern Xinjiang favor the term “Uyghuristan.” Uyghur activists from southern Xinjiang, who are more influenced by Turkey, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, generally prefer the term “East Turkistan.”

By incorporating “East Turkistan” in its name, the ETIM [East Turkistan Islamic Movement - in 2019, renamed TIP “Turkistan Islamic Party”] signals the separatist elements in its ideology… (and) avoids circumscribing the ETIM’s separatism as a strictly Uyghur cause, thus expanding the array of the ETIM’s potential benefactors. Indeed, the group’s constitution says its members “carry out jihad cooperatively with mujahideen Muslims from all over the world.” The ETIM has allegedly cooperated with non-Uyghur terrorist groups including Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and the IMU [Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan]. The suspected ETIM members detained at (Guantanamo) often used the term “East Turkestani” instead of “Uyghur”, characterizing themselves as nationals of the state they sought rather than as members of China’s 55 official minority groups.

(…) After 9/11, Chinese officials began discussing their domestic terrorism problem, using the term “East Turkestan” to refer to Uyghur separatists. This term distinguishes the separatists from the general population of Xinjiang and avoids identifying separatism with Uyghur ethnicity. By using the term “East Turkistan”, the PRC can refer pejoratively to Uyghur separatists without condemning all Uyghurs.

Incidentally, the relationship between the identity of "Turkic" and the influence of Turkey is that Turkish officials are promoting the Pan-Turkism agenda.
The viewpoint of a Uighur Uighurs history buff I know is that they believe that "Uyghur" is an ethnic group with multiple sources, and Turkic is only one of them.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/23615693
Taranchis, Kashgaris, and the 'Uyghur Question' in Soviet Central Asia
Quote:
‘If you ask a local Turk “who are you?” he will say “Kashgari” or “Hotani”. If you say “What about the name of this place?” he will just say “I am a Muslim”. If you say “No, I didn't ask you your religion,” he will be dumbstruck and say “I’m a chantou” [纏頭, “turban-wearer”]. Those who live together with the Kazakhs and Kirghiz will say, “we are sarts.” That is to say, they don’t even know who they are. Such ignorance!’
-Nazarkhoja Abdusematov;1914
Mentioned here chantou(纏頭)/turban-wearer.

The Qing government called this ethnic group chanhui(纏回)/turban-wearer Hui.
Hui was a general term for Muslims. After the establishment of PRC, Hui is used to name a Muslim group close to the Han. (however, in the mountainous areas of the most important Hui Autonomous Region, there are significant phenotypic differences between Hui and Han)

One theory is that the shaping of the national identity of the "Uighurs" was promoted under the policies of the pro Soviet warlords and their Russian advisers in the 1930s, and even within the "Uighurs" has been controversial.


The population data of Xinjiang in 2020 is 25.8523 million, including 10.9201 million Han and 14.9322 million ethnic minoritie(Including 11.6243 million Uighurs).
Whether defined as "Uygur Stan" or "East Turkestan", Hui Muslims are excluded from the group, while they have their own small autonomous region within Xinjiang.

Xingjiang also contains traditional settlements of Han and other non Muslim ethnic groups.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dzungaria
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Quote:
Dzungaria (/(d)zʊŋˈɡɛəriə/; also transliterated as Zungaria; Dzungharia or Zungharia; Dzhungaria or Zhungaria; Djungaria or Jungaria; or literally züüngar, Mongolian for "left hand") is a geographical subregion in Northwest China that corresponds to the northern half of Xinjiang—hence it is also known as Beijiang (Chinese: 北疆; pinyin: Běijiāng; lit. 'Northern Xinjiang'). Bounded by the Tian Shan mountain range to the south and the Altai Mountains to the north, it covers approximately 777,000 km2 (300,000 sq mi), extending into Western Mongolia and Eastern Kazakhstan. Prior to the Dzungar genocide, the term could cover a wider area, conterminous with the Dzungar Khanate, a state led by the Oirats in the 18th century which was based in the area.

Although geographically, historically, and ethnically distinct from the Turkic-speaking Tarim Basin area, the Manchu-led Qing dynasty and subsequent Chinese governments integrated both areas into one province, Xinjiang.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dzungar_genocide
Quote:
The Dzungar genocide (Chinese: 準噶爾滅族; lit. 'extermination of the Dzungar tribe') was the mass extermination of the Mongol Dzungar people by the Qing dynasty. The Qianlong Emperor ordered the genocide due to the rebellion in 1755 by Dzungar leader Amursana against Qing rule, after the dynasty first conquered the Dzungar Khanate with Amursana's support. The genocide was perpetrated by Manchu generals of the Qing army sent to crush the Dzungars, supported by Uyghur allies and vassals due to the Uyghur revolt against Dzungar rule.

The Dzungar Khanate was a confederation of several Tibetan Buddhist Oirat Mongol tribes that emerged in the early 17th century, and the last great nomadic empire in Asia. Some scholars estimate that about 80% of the Dzungar population, or around 500,000 to 800,000 people, were killed by a combination of warfare and disease during or after the Qing conquest in 1755–1757. After wiping out the native population of Dzungaria, the Qing government then resettled Han, Hui, Uyghur, and Xibe people on state farms in Dzungaria along with Manchu Bannermen to repopulate the area.
...
The Qing genocide against the Dzungar depopulated the land. This made the Qing-sponsored settlement of millions of ethnic Han Chinese, Hui, Central Asian oasis people (Uyghurs) and Manchu Bannermen in Dzungaria possible. Professor Stanley W. Toops noted that today's demographic situation is similar to that of the early Qing period in Xinjiang. In northern Xinjiang, the Qing brought in Han, Hui, Uyghur, Xibe, and Kazakh colonists after they exterminated the Dzungar Oirat Mongols in the region, with one third of Xinjiang's total population consisting of Hui and Han in the northern area, while around two thirds were Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang's Tarim Basin. In Dzungaria, the Qing established new cities like Ürümqi and Yining. After the Chinese defeated Jahangir Khoja in the 1820s, 12,000 Uyghur Taranchi families were deported by China from the Tarim Basin to Dzungaria to colonize and repopulate the area. The Dzungarian basin, which used to be inhabited by Dzungars, is currently inhabited by Kazakhs.

If need to explain, the Qing Dynasty was a Manchu Dynasty that enslaved and suppress all kinds of ethnic groups, including non noble Manchus.

However, it is worth mentioning that this decision was made after many wars between the Qing Dynasty and Jungar. Both Khalkha Mongols and Uighurs hate the brutal rule of the Jungar Mongols.

Although it is pointed out here that the current ethnic population proportion in Xinjiang is similar to that in the early Qing Dynasty. In fact, the proportion of non Muslim ethnic groups and Hui Muslims in the region once fell sharply due to the war in the Qing Dynasty. The restoration of its proportion was the result of resettlement after the Qing Dynasty.
Yaqub Beg's Kashgaria declares Jihad against the Dungans(A branch of modern Hui)
Quote:
Taranchi Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang initially cooperated with the Dungans (Hui people) when they rose in revolt, but later abandoned them after the Hui attempted to subject the entire region to their rule. The Taranchi massacred the Dungans at Kuldja and drove the rest through the Talk pass to the Ili Valley. The Hui people in Xinjiang where neither trusted by the Qing authorities nor the Turkestani Muslims.

Yaqub Beg's Kokandi Andijani Uzbek forces declared a Jihad against Dungan rebels under T'o Ming (Tuo Ming a.k.a. Daud Khalifa). Fighting broke out between Dungan and Kokandi Uzbek rebels in Xinjiang. Yaqub Beg enlisted Han militia under Xu Xuegong to fight against the Dungan troops under T'o Ming. T'o Ming's Dungan forces were defeated at the Battle of Urumqi (1870) as part of Yaqub Beg's plan to conquer Dzungaria and seize all Dungan territory. Poems were written about the victories of Yaqub Beg's forces over the Hans and the Dungans. Yakub Beg seized Aksu from Dungan forces and forced them north of the Tian Shan, committing massacres upon the Dungan people (Tunganis). Independent Han Chinese militia who were not affiliated with the Qing government joined both the Turkic forces under Yaqub Beg, and the Dungan rebels. In 1870, Yaqub Beg had 1,500 Han Chinese troops with his Turkic forces attacking Dungans in Ürümqi. The following year, the Han Chinese militia joined the Dungans in fighting against Turkic forces.

But Turkic Muslims welcomed "Chinese" rather than Yaqub beg after that:
Quote:
While Yaqub Beg asserted his authority over Kashgaria, the situation back home in Kokand changed radically. In May 1865, Alim Quli lost his life while defending Tashkent against the Russians. Many of his soldiers (primarily, of Kyrgyz and Kipchak background) deemed it advisable to flee to the comparative safety of Kashgaria. They appeared at the borders of Yaqub Beg's domain in early September 1865. Afghan warriors also assisted Yaqub Beg. Yaqub Beg's rule was unpopular among the natives with one of the local Kashgaris, a warrior and a chieftain's son, commenting: "During the Chinese rule there was everything; there is nothing now." There was also a falling-off in trade.

The local Uyghurs of Altishahr came to view Yaqub Beg as a Kokandi foreigner and his Kokandi associates behaved ruthlessly to the local Uyghurs, an anti Yaqub Beg poem was written by the Uyghur:

From Peking the Chinese came, like stars in the heaven.
The Andijanis rose and fled, like pigs in the forest.
They came in vain and left in vain, the Andijanis!
They went away scared and languidly, the Andijanis!
Every day they took a virgin, and
They went hunting for beauties.
They played with the dancing boys,
Which the Holy Law has forbidden.



Tensions between these communities persist to the present day.
Joanne N. Smith Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han relations (2013)
Quote:
In Xinjiang, there is a fairly long history of community supervision of marriage choices in general, and opposition to intermarriage with Han in particular. Documenting the evolution of Chinese policies towards ethnic intermarriage in Xinjiang during the last century, Li Xiaoxia provides many historical examples where the attempt made by a Han male to take a Uyghur wife resulted in rapid and grave local conflict. The most famous of these is of course the case which led to the Qumul (=Hami) rebellion in 1931 and the demise of the warlord Jin Shuren’s regime. Wary of the frequently adverse reactions among Uyghur communities to Uyghur-Han unions — including verbal humiliation, beatings, and threats of murder — in 1946, General Zhang Zhizhong of the National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China issued a legal prohibition against Muslim-Han intermarriage on the grounds that it led to ‘ethnic friction and disunity.’

Notwithstanding the above, other evidence suggests that the frequency of intermarriage and corresponding levels of community supervision fluctuated over time. For example, following the end of the Yaqub Beg regime (1864–77) in Qashqar, which strictly enforced Islamic morals, although the higher echelons of the Uyghur society continued to adhere strictly to Islamic values, the masses are said to have lapsed once again into ‘laxity.’ Among women, this laxity was reflected in the tendency to go about unveiled and in the preparedness of some to marry a Chinese.

(…) From the 1990s onwards, the Uyghur community has if anything become increasingly hostile to Uyghur-Han intermarriage. A Uyghur research assistant involved in Yee’s turn-of-the-century study on ethnic relations in Urumchi insisted that he would not allow his daughter to marry a Han Chinese lest he and his family were ‘looked down upon by his fellow people.’ Similarly, a contemporary Han scholar records how the relatives of a Uyghur woman in Turpan who took a Han husband would regularly hunt down the pair and beat them in an attempt to force separation, with the result that the couple finally left Turpan altogether. My own interviews suggest that, currently, few Uyghurs dare to pursue inter-ethnic relationships with Han people lest they encounter public disapproval. As Adil, a middle-aged male restaurateur, put it in 2002: ‘If we see a Uyghur marry a Han and see them together in the street, we feel anger in our hearts; we feel it is shameful [Uy. sat korunidu].’

Uyghur-Han couples who appear together in public risk the verbal and sometimes physical (violent) censure of the Uyghur community. In 1995, I interviewed a 19 year-old girl from Urumchi who had a Han boyfriend. She told me: ‘It’s really hard for us to even go out anywhere. If other Uyghurs see us together in public, they give us trouble. If Uyghur men see us together at a public bus, they swear at us and hit us. Uyghur women aren’t so bad, but they still make comments.’

(…) Perhaps worse than the disapprobation of strangers is the dismay of friends and colleagues in the Uyghur community, who will employ all means necessary to ‘persuade’ Uyghur peers to abandon a mixed union. In 2002, Zunun, a minkaomin (“[graduate] minority university student who took exams in [his] minority language”) service industry employee in his thirties, narrated the story of an inter-ethnic courtship between two co-workers, a Uyghur female (minkaomin) and a Han male. He described how all the Uyghur staff members, who worked on different floors of the building, had joined forces in urging their Uyghur friend not to marry the Han colleague, even though she insisted that she loved him. By the time I returned to Urumchi in 2004, their relationship had broken up. In this way, the most effective form of community supervision may come not from strangers but from one’s colleagues and friends.

The pressure of selective endogamy impacts with equal force upon minkaomin, who speak Chinese as their first language and interact mainly with Han at school, thus in theory are more likely candidates for a mixed union. Despite being visibly acculturated in dress, hairstyle, and manner, and speaking poor Uyghur but fluent Chinese, Burkhan, a fifteen-year-old minkaohan (“minority student educated in Chinese language”) boy, insisted in 2004 that he would never marry a Han peer. His explanation for his position centred on the potential for social ostracisation that the act entailed: ‘If I did [marry a Han girl], no Uyghur would come to visit me or be friends with me; no-one would have anything to do with me. That’s what my parents say.’ In a third case, Gulsham, twenty, a minkaohan student, described in 2004 what happened when she broached the subject of a Han boyfriend with a minkaomin friend:

“I asked my best friend— we met after I started university— what she would do if I got myself a Han boyfriend. She was furious, and said she would kick me in the face! … that the friendship wouldn’t be worth having if I did a thing like that … that she would break off our friendship and have nothing to do with me. She said: ‘What on earth are you thinking of, going with that kind of person? I would really look down on you if you did.”

When I asked her why her friend should have such an extreme reaction, she referred negatively to the insularity of her in-group, as she perceived it: “Uyghurs think that Hans eat pork and therefore that they’re dirty, you know… Uyghurs’ ethnic thinking” [Ch. minzu guannian] is very strong. They set themselves apart, they’re stand-offish: they exclude the Hans from their lives.”

This western propagate uses a large number of official Chinese documents. They did cite these documents, although in a piecemeal manner and added their own curses in between. And its Chinese original text is almost a very patient way to comfort the families and children of religious extremists who were forced to receive education.
It also quoted a text from Xi Jinping himself:
Quote:
In several surprising passages, given the crackdown that followed, Mr. Xi also told officials to not discriminate against Uighurs and to respect their right to worship. He warned against overreacting to natural friction between Uighurs and Han Chinese, the nation’s dominant ethnic group, and rejected proposals to try to eliminate Islam entirely in China.

“In light of separatist and terrorist forces under the banner of Islam, some people have argued that Islam should be restricted or even eradicated,” he said during the Beijing conference. He called that view “biased, even wrong.”

By the way, the following is Sadian, a small Hui Muslim autonomous region in Southwest China.
Image
Image
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There is the largest mosque in Indochina Peninsula.
During the cultural revolution, there was armed conflict between local Muslims and communists. After that, local Muslims built a large monument for this jihad.


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SkinnedWolf
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24 Jul 2022, 6:37 pm

Some surveys on "Vocational and technical schools"/"re-education camps".
The picture can be referred to, but his confession is not credible. (it is reliable to "prohibit speaking Uyghur in schools at the primary school stage". This is consistent with the treatment of Chinese dialects in schools.)
This guy holds a typical radical right-wing anti establishment political proposition.

The video was released in 2021. It is not clear when the material was obtained.

Several of them mentioned that the places marked as "concentration camps" by satellite icons were actually "detention centres". This is a general-purpose facility in whole of China's law enforcement system, which is used to detain suspect who have not been convicted.

If you need to compare: here is France's counter-terrorism activities.
https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/128/combatting_radicalisation_in_france_from_experimentation_to_professionalisation

Quote:
There is no internationally agreed-upon definition of violent extremism. It is a generational challenge and French authorities refer to the most common understanding of the term as defined by the Council of Europe: “behaviour promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy. This may include the violent opposition to core democratic principles or values” (European Committee on crime problems, 2016: 9). This includes terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and sectarian violence. ‘Violent extremism’ also identifies an enemy, or enemies, who are the object of hatred and violence. Not all violent extremist groups use terrorism as a tactic, so it is imprudent to conflate the terms ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. Violent extremist groups’ narratives tend to have several of the following elements: anti-constitutional/anti-democratic, fanatical, intolerant, single-minded, rejection of the rule of law, use of force/political violence, uniformity over diversity, collective goals over individual freedom (Schmid, 2013: 8-9).
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An anti-terror law promulgated on November 2014 included a travel ban on French nationals suspected to leave France to commit ‘terrorist activities, war crimes or crimes against humanity’ abroad. The law also authorises the authorities to block websites that glorify terrorism and jihadist ideology.
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The law had been enforced and courts ruled a broad range of crimes as terrorism-related offenses. The Official Bulletin of the Ministry of Justice specified, in October 2016, that “Since being extremist or radical is not in itself a criminal offence, the judicial institution has the duty to respond to extremism when it uses violence and the methods of terrorism. The problem being tackled is therefore not the one of radicalisation in its broadest sense, but the one of violent radicalisation, the association of an extremist ideology with the commission of a criminal offence”. The government allocated more human and financial resources. A budget of €735 million over three years would be dedicated to preventing and countering violent extremist, to monitor the jihadist threat and fight terrorism (government official website, 2015). In an effort to counter Islamist extremism in its prisons, the government engaged, in January 2016, in a short-lived experiment to isolate radicalised suspects from the rest of the prison population. The government ended the experiment in late October 2016, after concerns emerged that the programme was contributing to deepen radicalisation networks within prisons rather than contain it.
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One of the flagship measures of this plan was the opening of so-called ‘de-radicalisation centres’. In September 2016, the government opened the first of 12 planned ‘reintegration and citizenship’ centres in Pontourny, to address the danger posed by France’s radicalised youth. This de-radicalisation programme, run by the SG-CIPDR, was supposed to rehabilitate individuals deemed to be at-risk of radicalisation or individuals who ‘repented’ and wanted to reintegrate back into society. The idea was to instil ‘French civic and Republican values’, with flag raising every morning, as some form of counter-narrative to the violent extremism ideology (Alber et al., 2020). One-to-one tailored mentoring were organised for the volunteer residents. But the only centre that actually opened received only 9 residents. It had to close down in July 2017, after many controversies, among which the confusion around the concept of radicalisation and the objectives to be reached, the local opposition to have radicalised young people in the neighbourhood, and the unqualified staff3. €2.5 million were spent and considered insufficient by the centre’s managers (Senate committee report, 2017). The experiment, conceived in hast, had the merit of being tested.
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The first pillar is dedicated to preventing radicalisation. It involves the Education ministry at a much higher level than in the previous plans. It is no longer only a matter of preventing conspiracies or promoting media literacy, the Republican values of liberté, égalité, fraternité, or the secular value of laïcité, as it was the case in the 2016 plan. Schools are used as a tool to build young people’s resilience to radicalisation thus to counter radicalisation (similarities with the British strategy). Researchers had argued for a while that more young people are likely to see violence as a legitimate means of defending their beliefs, pointing out in their work that there is a greater risk of 'radical temptation' among young people who declare themselves to be Muslim (Muxel and Galland,2018). So, the new French plan adopted an approach of the Belgian model involving artists or influencers who identify themselves as Muslims (Saidi, Benzine, 2018) and promoted ten plays aimed at raising awareness among students about the problem of violent extremism, and to stimulate reflection on the processes involved. Between February 2018 and April 2019, 350,000 young people had seen the plays (CIPDR, 2019). The evaluations carried out after the plays, and the discussions that followed, revealed a transformation of the representations of youth concerning radicalisation and the concept of jihad.
...
In the second pillar, priority is given to early detection (secondary prevention) and training (primary prevention), but the process after the referral of a suspected radicalised youth is unclear. Detection implies registration of suspects in the ‘fichier S’. Created in 1969, the file ‘S’ is a list of people supposed to pose a security threat registered in the ‘wanted persons file’. Up to December 2020, more than 25000 persons (exact number unspecified) were registered, 50% of which identified as radical Islamists (Ministry of interior). It doesn’t mean that the person listed in the file is dangerous. He/she is under scrutiny; the intelligence services are informed in case of a control of the individual somewhere on the national territory (or at the borders) but not necessarily subject to active surveillance. To that file ‘S’ is added the FSPRT. Created in 2015, the Fichier des Signalements pour la prévention de la Radicalisation à caractère Terroriste-FSPRT (reports file for the prevention of radicalisation leading to terrorism) is a database flagging extremists whose radicalisation has a terrorist dimension (more than 22000 as of October 2020; Ministry of Interior, 2020). Not all of the S files are in the FSPRT file. Up to January 2021, the CIPDR, through the prefectures, took charge of more than 5000 young people, under 25 year old (CIPDR official website). The majority of reports now come from the field and no longer from the free-toll number.


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26 Jul 2022, 3:28 am

Xinjiang terrorism and the "forgotten people"
NYT; August 17, 2015; Chinese language

Quote:
In 1997, Yining City, located in Xinjiang, a remote region in Western China, triggered violent protests because of the execution of independence advocates. Four years later, Nick Holdstock went to Yining, where he worked as an English teacher for a year.

Later, he wrote this experience into his first book, the tree that bleeds: a Uighur town on the edge. The Uyghur and Han people in the community described in the book are estranged from each other. Uighurs are native to Xinjiang, and their language belongs to Turkic language family. Most of them are Muslims, while Han people account for the vast majority of China's population. Hosdak's latest book, China's forgotten people: Xinjiang, terrorist and the Chinese state, analyzes the problem of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang. He believes that this problem is mainly caused by the rebound brought by the Chinese government's harsh policies in this region at the beginning of this century. Hofstadter, 41, now lives in Edinburgh, Scotland, and recently published the novel the casualties. In an interview with the times, he talked about terrorism, Uighur pop songs and the changing population structure of Xinjiang. The following is an excerpt of the content:

Q: your first book takes Xinjiang as the theme, which makes people feel the flavor of life in a region that is not known to outsiders. So, by writing this forgotten people, what do you hope to achieve from it?

A: after the terrorist attack in Kunming in 2014 (33 people were killed by gangsters with knives in Kunming Railway Station), many Western media wrote in a way that made people feel that Xinjiang had a long-term record of terrorist attacks, but in fact, this was just a repetition of the assertion made by the Chinese government since the September 11, 2001 incident in New York. This book attempts to correct these ideas for non professionals.

Q: many attacks were attributed to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). What do you know about this group?

A: I know very little. The problem with ETIM is that this group is vague and mysterious. They probably have no other activities except publishing videos online. Even today, security experts seem to be talking about Al Qaeda. But the charges against them are not based on facts. Among the events known as terrorist attacks, the specific circumstances and reasons behind many of them can only be considered ambiguous at best. There is no organized group responsible for these violent incidents, or explicitly implicated in them.
One difficulty in understanding the situation in Xinjiang is that the media rarely report there, unless it involves Islam or violence.

Q: what kind of image is Xinjiang in China?

A: until recently, the official media said that everything was normal. Most people knew Xinjiang before because they saw a minority nationality who was good at singing and dancing on the official TV station. After the 911 incident(Personal note: refers to the terrorist attacks= in Kunming in 2014.), the Chinese government began to use different expressions. After the outbreak of riots in Urumqi in 2009, the cognition of many people across the country has changed. In their minds, Xinjiang has changed from a place full of good singers and abundant fruits to a place full of violence and danger.

Q: there is a view in the book that violence is not only in Xinjiang. The violent conflicts caused by the competition for land and resources are actually all over China.

A: Yes, I want to examine the events in Xinjiang within the framework of the entire national policy. In China, we can see a widespread gap between urban and rural areas, as well as the pressure caused by the shortage of water and other resources. In this book, I put forward that the poverty in rural areas of Xinjiang is not the result of pure ethnic discrimination, especially in southern Xinjiang, where the Uygur population accounts for the majority. But considering the restrictions on Uyghur communities in all other fields, such as culture, language and religion, it is not surprising that many Uyghur people would think that way.

Q: what do you know about the rumors about restrictions on wearing Islamic clothes or compulsory selling of alcohol?

A: there must be some local officials implementing some policies, including forcing stores to sell alcohol in areas mainly inhabited by Uighurs, or trying to ban women from wearing headscarves. The problem is that we don't have reliable information. Reporters rarely go to those places for interviews, and we have little contact with the daily life of these places.

Q: in the book, you also expressed a view that pop culture is a force for change in Xinjiang. You talked about a song about a guest coming home and never leaving again. This is obviously a metaphor for the Han people who came to Xinjiang to settle down.

A: Yes, this kind of thing can let you know people's inner feelings, not just where the explosion occurred again. These songs and poems do not express the resentment caused by the thought of Jihad, but reflect the concerns of many ordinary people living in these communities.

Q: will they spread?

A: people will exchange them with each other. Although strictly monitored and often shut down, Uighur language websites are still a way for people to share information. Among younger or more proficient people, there will be some pop cultural works that allude to political issues. I don't think the examiners' proficiency in Uyghur is enough for them to quickly identify these things. Therefore, they can still have a certain impact.

Q: some western historical views on the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) believe that China's rule over Xinjiang can only be traced back to the 18th century, and was achieved by conquest and even genocide at that time. In academia, China has fought back.

A: in China, this is not in the scope of discussion at all. If any ambiguous remarks on this issue are allowed, the government's view that Xinjiang has always been a part of China will be fatally affected. But you can also raise the same question about the view that all dynasties are "Chinese".

Q: what do you think of lobbying groups based overseas, such as World Uyghur Congress?

A: they have played a role in raising awareness of Xinjiang, especially in the United States. Therefore, we should applaud them. However, radical demands and propositions sometimes lead them to exaggerate their reasons, or have a very strong selectivity in the face of facts. This is very regrettable, because a little more care will have the same effect, and they will not be accused of distorting the facts.

Q: how do they exaggerate their reasons?

A: for example, when it comes to the details of the incident in the casualty report, they are unreliable. Sometimes it's just that a certain national policy is not implemented in place in Xinjiang, but they will act as if everything is intentional, just to discriminate against Uighurs. They will use unproven words like "genocide", which are easy to arouse excitement. Such ill considered behaviors have caused losses to themselves.

Q: Rebiya Kadeer, chairman of World Uyghur Congress, doesn't often mention that she once acted as an adviser to the government.

A: her autobiography is a kind of self remodeling. She claimed that she had been working in the system for the benefit of her compatriots, and only left when this became impossible. Looking back, she has a theory to explain how she became the richest woman in China before she was arrested (arrested in 1999 for divulging state secrets and released in 2005 for health reasons). She claimed that only then could she help the disadvantaged Uighur group.

Q: in many parts of China, we can see the revival of religion. What is the situation in Xinjiang? When we see the spread of Islamic costumes and related behaviors, is this a religious revival?

A: I think Xinjiang is different from many Chinese places. In Xinjiang, many Uighurs turn to religion to highlight their differences from the Han people. This is not against materialism or something like that.

Q: according to the demographic data, in Xinjiang, the proportion of Han and Uygur people is equal, accounting for 40% each, and other nationalities account for 20%. Do you believe it? Or are the Han people in the majority now?

A: because of the household registration system, many Han people are registered in other places, so they may not appear in the statistical data of Xinjiang. Therefore, the population proportion must have changed. But politically, it is hard to admit that in a place called the Uygur Autonomous Region, the Han nationality now has a majority population.

Q: Xinjiang seems to be different from Tibet in this regard. Many Han people seem unable to trek to Tibet at a higher altitude, but they are not worried about Xinjiang.

A: Yes. The climate in Xinjiang is also more acceptable. Urumqi is actually a Han City, and this situation has lasted for a long time. There are large shopping centers there, which are no different from other big cities in China. You will feel that the living standard of Han people is catching up. In Urumqi, the contrast with the Uighur populated areas is quite obvious. You won't think the Uygur inhabited areas are very prosperous.

Q: on the whole, what is China's strategy in Xinjiang?

A: I wonder if there is a 20-year or 30-year strategy for Xinjiang. Officials may hope that if Han people continue to settle in Xinjiang and marginalize Uighur identity, the opposition will disappear. Maybe so. At present, they are mainly investing in core industries, and still encourage mainlanders to settle in Xinjiang. I don't think the level of violence will be serious enough to make the authorities willing to deal with this problem. As told to the public, they have done a good job in dealing with this problem at home. I'm not sure whether they intend to have a dialogue with those dissatisfied Uighur groups.

Q: is your new work "the casualties" related to Xinjiang?

A: it doesn't matter, but the book does mention Urumqi. This book is a fable of the era before the end of the world, describing the lives of people who are not accepted by the mainstream society. It involves personal and global disasters, as well as the difficulties of change.


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26 Jul 2022, 3:28 pm

(last year)External network PRC citizen community(A moderate anti CCP community) discussion translation:

Quote:
What happened in Xinjiang in 2016?
According to Wikipedia, the number of terrorist activities in Xinjiang increased year by year as a whole in the 2010's, until a cliff like decline occurred in 2016. There was only one terrorist activity in 16 years, and there has been no terrorist activity since 17 years. My question is, what happened in 2016, which greatly reduced terrorist activities?

Wikipedia attributed this improvement entirely to Chen Quanguo's tough governance:

"After Chen Quanguo took office, he overturned the former Zhang Chunxian's flexible policy of governing Xinjiang, took strong measures to monitor and control the people of Xinjiang, including Uygurs, on a large scale, and established a "re education center", which has successfully prevented terrorist attacks in Xinjiang since the beginning of 2017."

However, looking carefully at Chen Quanguo's resume, I found that this statement seems to be unreasonable, because Chen Quanguo's date of appointment is August 29, 2016, which is already the second half of 2016, and it is estimated that it will take oneortwo months to master the work and implement the policy. It is estimated that the real effect will be after 2017, but in fact, the reduction in terrorist activities occurred from the beginning of 2016, that is, before Chen took office.

Looking at the most eye-catching re education camp policy in Xinjiang, Wikipedia mentioned,

"Since 2017, the camp has been scaled up and expanded rapidly, and the construction has reached a climax under the line of continuously strengthening the policy of governing Xinjiang"

That is to say, the expansion of re education camp also began in 2017 and cannot affect 2016.

Googled the old news of that year, including the confiscation of passports, the implementation of bilingual education, and the prohibition of parents from forcing their children to believe. It also failed to see any direct relationship with the reduction of terrorist attacks.

Thread A:
Quote:
After Chen Quanguo came to power, Xinjiang began:

-One police post every 500 meters

-Uyghur police/auxiliary-police are widely used in Uyghur areas to deal with Uyghur

-Organize militia patrols, and businesses in the streets should organize anti-terrorism and anti riot training

-Strengthen the Internet monitoring by the internet police and destroy the violent and terrorist propaganda videos imported from abroad (this is why the Xinjiang network disk cannot share videos for a period of time)

-It is stipulated that imams and mullahs in mosques must be official, and wild imams who study abroad and underground lecturing points are prohibited

-Giribafu (Burka) who was spread from Saudi Arabia to Xinjiang was forbidden in Xinjiang

-Minors under the age of 18 are prohibited from participating in religious activities

-We will implement Chinese Uyghur bilingual education in ethnic schools and change the previous problem teaching materials.

-Recruiting Han teachers from the mainland

-It is stipulated that school-age children in southern Xinjiang must go to school (95% of violent terrorists are under junior high school). If the local dropout rate remains high, the leading group will be directly replaced

-Strengthen poverty alleviation in Xinjiang (from 2000 to 2010, the central government subsidized Xinjiang a total of 400billion yuan (of which 87.8 billion yuan in 2009), while 42.24 billion yuan in 2019.)

-Establish anti extremist schools (that is, concentration camps in the West) for people who have not participated in violence and terrorism but have been affected by extremism

-Promoting Mandarin education throughout Xinjiang

(some of the above policies were implemented during the period of Zhang Chunxian, but they are not as extensive and comprehensive as those implemented by Chen Quanguo.)

Quote:
But why didn't Chen see terrorist activities for more than half a year before he took office? In 2014 and 2015, there is an average of once every few weeks.

Quote:
The main problems in Xinjiang are the "two pan" problems, pan Turkism and pan Islamism. You can read Wang Lixiong's "my West China; your East Turkestan". In fact, it is the economic reasons that encourage Uighur nationalism and Islamic extremism. The economy of the Uygur region in southern Xinjiang is too backward, the educational background and Chinese level of the local nationalities are also relatively low, and the living standard is too far behind that of the Han people, which leads to:

Han people think Uyghur is a backward nation, inferior to themselves, resulting in discrimination.

Because of the discrimination from the Han nationality, the ordinary Uyghur people have a low sense of national identity, dislike the Han people, and feel that the Han people occupy all resources, which is very unfair.

Therefore, ordinary Uighurs will support, sympathize with, and even join national independence and religious extremist forces.

Han people will feel that Uygurs are terrorists, which aggravates discrimination, so it becomes a vicious circle

When Wang Lequan and Zhang Chunxian were in charge of Xinjiang, they were fighting against terrorism rather than poverty, which is why terrorists are fighting more and more.
Now, although there is a one size fits all phenomenon, it is anti-terrorism plus anti-poverty. You should know that there are many Uyghur people in the rural areas of Southern Xinjiang, whose education level is only primary school or junior high school. To let them learn Chinese, learn technology, and find jobs for them is to help them economically and fundamentally solve the problem.

Quote:
Poverty is a breeding ground for crime. I have a deep understanding. Nothing is of great use without fighting poverty.

Quote:
Kashgar, Khotan and other places in the west of Southern Xinjiang are blocked by traffic, and are the least developed places in China. Now, if this kind of high-pressure policy in Xinjiang can help ordinary Uyghur people escape poverty and live a good life, the pain will be short-lived.

Quote:
At the same time, we should put an end to possible ethnic discrimination, whether Han discriminate against Uighurs or Uighurs discriminate against Han.

Quote:
Hmm, but the economic data is the fastest growing in 2010-2014, more than 10%.

Quote:
During Zhang Chunxian's period, only some cities in Northern Xinjiang had a good economy, while places with many Uighurs in southern Xinjiang were still poor.

Thread B:
Quote:
The big reason is that East Turkistan responded to the call of the Islamic state and went to the Middle East. At that time, the Islamic state opened a second front in Central Asia, and many people were left in Central Asia. There is a proper noun called migration jihad.

Quote:
This is called ijirat, which began in the 1990s. In fact, passports were not so easy to get after 1995. Many violent terrorists could not leave the country, but decided to launch "Jihad" in China. A typical example is the attack on Kunming railway station.

Quote:
Yes, but it has been relaxed since 2015. In July, 2015, Shihezi began the pilot project. The data were simplified, and the passports were kept by themselves. It can be said that they were allowed to leave.

Quote:
From this point of view, we should thank the Islamic state.

Thread C:
Quote:
The actual terrorist attacks in 14-16 years were more than those in Wikipedia, especially the attempted ones. As far as I know, there were several people who drove a car to attack the Public Security Bureau in Northern Xinjiang at the beginning of 2015. The decline in the number of terrorist attacks in 16 years is more due to the "crowd tactics" in 14-15 years plus multiple severe preventive measures.

Let's talk about how to strictly control everything I know. Since the second half of the year, local departments of industry and commerce, education, culture, taxation, etc. have dispatched a large number of backbone civil servants to the community, 24-hour shifts, several times a week of population survey, community collective spirit construction (flag raising ceremony, party class, etc.). There is also the "visit Huiju" upstairs, which is popularly said to be making relatives. Those who are lucky go to the nearest village to eat and live with poor villagers, and those who are unlucky go directly to southern Xinjiang to live for more than half a month. In addition, a large number of Uyghur ethnic groups with bad backgrounds in Northern Xinjiang were "repatriated" back to southern Xinjiang, and all possible extremists were sent away. Even if foreign extremists sneaked in, they could not stand.

In addition, a large number of armed police officers and auxiliary police were recruited and deployed. Security checks were carried out in all public places (starting at the end of 2014, and it was still very loose in August and September of 2014). Sentries were equipped at every intersection. Security checks were carried out on highways, especially in cities.
In the summer of 2015, I went back to Xinjiang for almost a month. During that time, my small city almost conducted two large unannounced drills of the access to the city, because a suspicious explosive in the car was not found out. It is said that it was directly punished people on the whole line.

Finally, all public gatherings were banned, with square dance bearing the brunt, and other night markets, large stalls, shopping malls, literary and artistic performances were not allowed. This completes all prevention from the source to the process to the final possible incident scenario.

This is only the situation in Northern Xinjiang, so it is not surprising that southern Xinjiang is several times severe.
In terms of the complexity of the environment in southern Xinjiang and the prevalence of separatism, I can't imagine what means they have taken, plus serious opacity and information blockade. People who have lived in Northern Xinjiang for a long time will certainly not be able to clearly understand the truth of Southern Xinjiang.

By the year of 17, large-scale re education camps had been the second stage of maintaining stability.

Quote:
Thanks for your advice. It seems that the local people are really not easy. I hope that one day they can get peace without everyone working so much.

Quote:
It is said that from 2009 to 14 or 15 years in southern Xinjiang, there were many cases of being killed and exterminated by unknown Uyghur people, often all the members of an ordinary family were destroyed. I have a distant cousin under Kashgar. He had no choice but to send his wife and children away and stay on duty alone in the village.

Add: After a detailed interview with my friend who lives in the Muslim area next to Xinjiang, her testimony:
Quote:
You really don't know how terrible Xinjiang was before the crackdown! Those oil workers who were dispatched to Xinjiang at that time dared not even go out. If you go out and are killed, the murderer can't be caught at all. The PLA would be blown to pieces for checking the parcels on the streets. My father was a long-distance bus driver at that time, and every driver had weapons under his seat.

When I was five years old, I was almost robbed and killed by Uighurs. My father pulled me and was chased by a car of Uygurs. My father pulled my mother, my mother held me and drove away for half a night.

My cousin was born in Xinjiang. Because Xinjiang was too chaotic, his parents desperately sent him to the mainland when he was a child. He lives in Guangzhou now. He never returned to his hometown before Xinjiang became peaceful. This year, his father asked my father to drink at their house. This was unimaginable before.

Now all control is tried with human life.

Now, the Duku highway in Xinjiang is blocked by tourists, so beautiful scenery. Guess why no one went there before the epidemic.

In fact, as long as there is peace, culture don't cannot be inherited. For example, we could take the Koran in high school. Hui in our class like to learn that very much.

A Uighur activist's view of tourists:
Quote:
In order to develop Xinjiang's tourism industry and attract Chinese tourists abroad to Xinjiang, tourism supporting facilities have been under construction for the past four years, starting from northern Xinjiang to the south. Moreover, it has ordered to stop the wrong behaviors in the past. For example, Xinjiang's local style buildings have been allowed. The cement boxes that are no longer stereotyped can be rebuilt, and the traditional houses that have been "destroyed for the old culture" (Note: the Cultural Revolution) can be rebuilt, and Xinjiang's local culture can be carried forward. To this end, the central government took the lead in promoting Xinjiang bit by bit, so that mainlanders can gradually understand Xinjiang. Moreover, in order to maintain the tourism market, the Xinjiang authorities have severely cracked down on extortion and those swindlers who specifically pit fellow villagers.

The 1.4 billion people may all become tourists in Xinjiang. If two hundred million tourists can come every year, it will be enough for Xinjiang people to get rid of poverty.

Thread D:
Quote:
Domestic microclimate, international macroclimate.

Microclimate has been explained by others. Let me add the macroclimate.

Overall, according to the data of the global terrorism database, 2014 was the peak of global terrorist attacks. Since then, the number of terrorist attacks has decreased year by year, each year less than the previous year. Because 2014 was the heyday of the Islamic state, which was able to "export revolution", but it was followed by the joint crackdown of the international community. For example, in 15 years, the Russian army entered Syria, and the Iraqi army began the counter offensive with the support of the United States. In 16 years, the Islamic state had only a small piece of territory, which was destroyed in 18 years. Therefore, the scope of influence of extreme Islamism has shrunk rapidly in recent years, and the number of terrorist attacks has decreased.

In addition, ETIM was listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations and Britain and the United States in 2016, which greatly restricted its activities. A major role of ETIM was to recruit forces from Xinjiang to receive military training and ideological training. In those years when extreme Islamism was strong, many people returned to China to publicize extreme ideas, bring funds and technology, and trigger or directly create terrorist attacks.

Quote:
Thanks for your advice. I saw that the time when Britain and the United States listed ETIM as a terrorist organization / sanctions was in the second half of 2016, which was close to the time when Chen took office. And the United States seems to have removed it from the list of terrorist organizations last year. From this point of view, the impact of the United States on the decline in the number of terrorist activities should be relatively small.


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26 Jul 2022, 11:10 pm

An undisclosed investigation and interview of a terrorist activity by a famous reporter of Chinese media. (a media faction accustomed to criticism. Sometimes they are seen as liberals within the CCP. Although the substantive relationship between some of them and CCP seems suspicious.)

Quote:
BBC’s recent coverage on Xinjiang police files has prompted extensive discussion in international community. It also brought back nostalgia of a past investigation in Xinjiang from nine years ago. On June 26 2013, the town of Lukeqin in Shanshan County, Turpan, Xinjiang, was under terrorist attack by more than two dozens of Uyghurs. Police station, armed police base and town government were all under attack, causing more than ten casualties. After what happened, me and my crew visited Lukeqin to investigate. However, our programme didn’t get to air in the end. Today, I’d like to open up about what was in that programme that the world didn’t get to watch.



About the background information before these things.
Quote:
"Two less and one wider", that is, the notice of the Central Commission of political science and law on consolidating and developing the achievements of the first campaign to crack down on criminal activities and preparing for the second campaign (Zhongfa [1984] No. 5) in 1984 proposed that "for criminals from ethnic minorities, democratic parties, religious circles, returned overseas Chinese, and Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan compatriots entering the country, we should adhere to the principle of less arrest and less killing", and required that criminals in these aspects be punished, "If a representative at or above the county level wants to be arrested and handled, it should be reported to the relevant provincial political and legal departments for approval; if a representative at or above the provincial level wants to be arrested and handled, it should be reported to the relevant central political and legal departments for approval", and the handling is generally lenient.


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Cover your eyes, if you like. It will serve no purpose.

You might expect to be able to crush them in your hand, into wolf-bone fragments.
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27 Jul 2022, 3:17 am

July 5th, 2009. Urumqi.

Description from WikiLeaks:
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING1972_a.html

Quote:
Urumqi and Kashgar remained calm July 11-13, according to a U.S. Embassy team on the ground there, with no reports of new violence. The government July 11 revised the official death toll upward to 184 and provided an ethnic breakdown which showed that three quarters of the riot fatalities were Han. Official Chinese media, however, did not report the ethnicity of the dead (Chinese officials have described the numbers as "too sensitive" to show domestic audiences). The death toll may continue to rise, as Chinese officials have characterized more than 70 of the wounded as "near death." Urumqi PSB July 13 returned the passport of an Amcit who was detained briefly following the riot. The Amcit, who had his passport confiscated after PSB spotted him taking pictures of the riot aftermath, has since departed for Beijing. Two mid- level Xinjiang officials visited the Embassy July 10 as part of a previously arranged USG exchange program. The two remarked that the reasons for the riots were "complex" but the Uighurs who committed violence against Han July 5 represent only a small minority. Hinting at Han resentment, one of the officials said the government should rethink policies exempting Uighurs from the one-child policy and granting them preferential university admission. End Summary.
...
Xinjiang officials on July 11 raised the death toll from 156 to 184. Authorities also revised the number of injured to 1,680. On July 12, according to media reports, Xinjiang Chairman Nur Berkri announced that of the 939 injured who remain in the hospital, 216 are seriously injured and Berkri warned the deal toll could go higher. For the first time July 11, the government released an ethnic breakdown of the 184 dead: 137 Han, 46 Uighurs, and one ethnic Hui. This ethnic breakdown was reported in China Daily, an official English- language newspaper, but has not been mentioned in the PRC's Chinese-language press. Nevertheless, these figures have been reported in several Chinese blogs and Internet chat rooms. (Note: MFA officials told A/DCM July 10 that the ethnic breakdown of the dead was too sensitive to release domestically because the high number of Han dead could lead to further reprisals, see Ref A.) Weekend media coverage in the Chinese press highlighted government financial assistance to victims, including payments of compensation and funeral expenses of RMB 210,000 (USD 31,000) to the family of each victim.
...
On July 10, ConOff spoke to two Xinjiang officials: Ren Xinjun, Director of the Xinjiang Foreign Affairs Office Protocol Office, and Zheng Ping, Vice President of the Xinjiang Women's Federation (protect both). Ren and Zheng, both Han officials who were born and raised in Urumqi, visited the Embassy on their way to participate in a IVLP program in the United States. Both left Urumqi on July 6, immediately after the first wave of rioting July 5. Both Ren and Zheng were visibly disturbed and saddened by the violence and deaths. Zheng said that a former director at the Women's Federation, a 65-year-old Han woman, was beaten to death July 5 on her way to a medical appointment. While the June 26 factory brawl in Shaoguan, Guangdong Province was a factor in starting the violence, the real reasons, Zheng said, were "complex." The July 5 rioters were young and irrational, Zheng added, and represented a small percentage of the total Uighur population. Ren said the government should review its ethnic affairs policy of giving special advantages to minorities such as exemption from the one-child policy and
puniversity admission. Such policies are "not working," Ren asserted. Both noted that Xinjiang authorities had been transparent with the media. This, Ren and Zheng said, showed that China had learned from the Tibet unrest of March 2008.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING2183_a.html
Quote:
For three weeks following the initial July 5 violence in Urumqi, a series of EmbOffs visited Xinjiang to seek out solid information about the incident and its aftermath. Using the information gathered, we have put together a timeline of the events that began that day. Following is one of those first drafts of history that may be altered in time, but for now we are confident that we have gotten the record straight. Embassy officers, who were present in Urumqi less than 24 hours after the initial violence was reported and on the ground for two and a half weeks after the initial rioting, had access to a wide range of Xinjiang residents in Urumqi, Kashgar and Khotan. Surveillance by Chinese security services was persistent but for the most part did not prohibit EmbOffs from having conversations. Local authorities in Kashgar did order our second group of visiting Embassy officers "not to conduct interviews." Uighur residents were generally less eager to speak to Embassy officers than Han citizens were, but the number of people with whom we spoke, including numerous Uighurs, provides some confidence in our compilation of the events of July 5-7. Key observations: The violence that occurred the night of July 5, separated by a few hours from the initial, mostly peaceful Xinjiang University protest at People's Square, was overwhelmingly Uighur violence against Han. The Urumqi police response on July 5 appears to have been inadequate, allowing the rioting to flare out of control. In contrast, deployed PAP troops in Urumqi on July 7 contained the violent and deadly Han counter-riot more quickly.

We continue to watch with concern the Chinese response to the riots, including what appear to be indiscriminate arrests of Uighur men, and have urged the Chinese government to be transparent and impartial in their treatment of criminal suspects. The below record will be worth reviewing as we look down the road at what surely will be continued international concern at how the Chinese "render justice" in the aftermath of this incident. End summary and comment.

On the afternoon of July 5, Xinjiang University students staged a demonstration on Urumqi's People's Square to protest the June 26 deaths of Uighur factory workers at the hands of Han Chinese cohorts in Guangdong. According to contacts, the police allowed the demonstrators to convene for a short time before dispersing the crowd and arresting some of the leaders; the police did not use lethal force at this point. At approximately 8:00 pm, hours after the People's Square demonstration had broken up, groups of Uighurs, most of whom had not participated in the original protest, began circulating through ethnically mixed areas of the city near Erdaoqiao and apparently at random murdered dozens of Han civilians and destroyed Han-owned businesses and property. Most victims, including women and the elderly, were beaten to death.

According to contacts, the violence surprised the Urumqi police, whose crowd control measures failed. There appeared to witnesses to have been no coordinated response to the violence until the deployment of the first PAP units at approximately 11:30 pm. The first use of firearms occurred at this time, according to witnesses who heard shots. Eyewitnesses report seeing the arrest of dozens of rioters. The Chinese government acknowledges that People's Armed Police (PAP) responding to the violence killed Uighur rioters, but EmbOffs found no eyewitnesses -- neither Uighur nor ethnic Han -- who reported witnessing the use of lethal force against Uighur rioters on July 5-6. Many Uighur contacts claimed to know of Uighur residents who had been detained during and in the wake of the July 5 incident, and one Uighur contact told EmbOffs he knew of two Uighur youths murdered during the July 7 Han-on-Uighur mob violence. EmbOffs met several Han residents who claimed to have lost family members, acquaintances or neighbors to the violence on July 5-6. PolOff personally witnessed Han residents engaged in the "counter riot" on July 7. Police and PAP deployed after the initial riots and, while clearly reluctant to use force against Han rioters, did use tear gas and physical force to ensure that no mosques were damaged.
...
In the days leading up to July 5, Uighur students connected with Xinjiang University began relatively open preparations for a demonstration on People's Square protesting the June 26 death of Uighur migrant laborers in Shaoguan, Guangdong Province. Beijing-based contacts have told us that security forces had been aware of the planned protest and seemed to be preparing for it in relatively routine fashion, treating it as another instance of demonstrations and protests that occur on a daily basis in China. An American citizen teaching English in Urumqi told us that students reportedly had used websites such as Facebook to coordinate the demonstrations and circulate photos of the violence in Shaoguan. Protesters had reportedly chosen to demonstrate on July 5 because of rumors that the remains of the Uighur laborers killed in Shaoguan would be returned to Xinjiang that day. A Uighur lawyer in Urumqi told us that he had been aware of the preparations and had seen emailed photos of the Uighurs killed in Shaoguan in the days prior to July 5. The lawyer noted he had been surprised that Chinese authorities had not taken any measures to censor or block these online exchanges.

The Uighur lawyer told EmbOffs he had witnessed the initial July 5 protest. At approximately 3:00 pm on July 5, Xinjiang University and Xinjiang Normal University students gathered at People's Square. Other eyewitnesses estimated the number of protesters in the hundreds. The protesters carried flags and signs including some that read "we are Chinese citizens." The lawyer said that demonstrators were calling on Xinjiang Province Chairman Nur Bekri to meet with them to discuss the Shaoguan incident. Several hours after the protest began, according to Urumqi residents with whom we spoke, municipal police (not People's Armed Police) dispersed the crowds. The Uighur lawyer, who could see the demonstration from his office, watched the police disperse the protesters and move them away from the square. He did not witness any violence by either police or protesters. Another Uighur contact said that after police told the students the protest was illegal and that they had to disperse, several students objected. The police used force to detain a young Uighur woman who argued with the police. This led to a scuffle as police attempted to arrest the woman but did not result in any use of lethal force by police.
...
An American citizen resident of Urumqi, who said he had ventured out on a bicycle around midnight, told us he had counted sixteen Han bodies, including one older woman and a younger woman. All appeared to have been bludgeoned, and one man had been dragged out of his car and beaten to death. He said he had witnessed a group of approximately 20 young, male Uighurs cheering while carrying bricks, sticks and machetes.

He also saw small groups of Han Chinese fleeing from the violence. Another American citizen who claimed to have observed the violence from his apartment said most of the rioters were young Uighur men in their teens and twenties. Roughly 10 percent of the Uighur rioters, he said, were women, who were pointing out Han victims and encouraging the men to attack.
...
A third-country national who said he was taking shelter in a restaurant during the violence reported that he had ventured out into the streets around 11:30 pm and seen trucks bringing bloodied Han Chinese to the hospital. A young, college-educated Uighur resident in the southern Xinjiang city of Hetian (Khotan), who claimed to have heard first-hand accounts of the violence from friends who had returned from Urumqi, said that after violence had erupted as a result of the police breaking up the protest in People's Square, violence broke out, "some policemen were killed," and then "some Uighurs did bad things."

Our contacts almost universally agreed that the violence by roaming groups of Uighur youths had continued unopposed for some hours and that there had been no coordinated reaction by the police until late in the evening. Witnesses generally agreed that the first gunshots had been heard several hours after the outbreak of violence. An American citizen told us that at approximately 9:30 pm she had seen a group of municipal police attempting to use sticks and ax handles to clear people from the road. Another American citizen reported first seeing armed security personnel in formations blocking vehicle traffic on several streets at 11:45 pm. Shortly after that, he said, he first heard several bursts of gunfire. The Canadian citizen reported that starting about 12:30 am (i.e., early July 6), he had heard scattered bursts of gunfire.
...
Beijing University Assistant Professor Yu Wanli told PolOff in Beijing that a friend on the Urumqi municipal police force had told him that police had been afraid to fire their weapons when the violence broke out. "Everyone knew" that shots fired would set off a full-blown riot, and the police were convinced they were not strong enough to hold off an angry crowd. They knew the army would not come to save them, so they did not fire on protesters, Yu said. Later, when the riots disintegrated into roving bands, police had used force and fired their weapons, but not until very late at night. Yu said his friend had great feelings of guilt and believed that if police had been willing to use deadly force earlier, they could have prevented many deaths, but they had been unprepared to handle the intense violence.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING2555_a.html
Quote:
Security forces locked down central Urumqi late September 3 in the wake of protests by as many as "tens of thousands" of ethnic Han demonstrators, but failed to prevent smaller protests from breaking out September 4. The official PRC Xinhua News Agency said the protesters on September 3 had numbered in the "several tens of thousands." Most businesses and schools were closed September 4, and authorities were urging residents to remain indoors. In Urumqi, People's Armed Police blocked the downtown area to traffic. On September 4, PolOffs witnessed groups of several hundred Han residents gathering in the streets and observed two Han being arrested after confronting police. According to one Han contact, September 3 demonstrators had focused their anger on Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan, and many had shouted slogans for Wang to step down to take responsibility for his failure to restrain anti-Han violence by Uighurs. PAP troops, our contact said, deployed in force near the South Gate (Nanmen) area to prevent Han protesters from entering Uighur neighborhoods. Contacts said the city's Han community remained angry and frightened by rumors of continued random attacks by Uighur assailants armed with tainted syringes, a story spread across the front pages of China's newspapers. China's official media tried to downplay the ethnic dimensions of the incident, emphasizing that members of several ethnic groups were among the stabbing victims. PolOff observed that the Rebiya Kadeer Trade Tower was unoccupied and surrounded by fencing. Asked about the Rebiya Tower, a Xinjiang FAO Deputy Director General acknowledged that the building had been closed but said the provincial government "still has not decided whether or not to tear it down." End Summary.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING2946_a.html
Quote:
During October 19-21 travel to Urumqi, PolOffs confirmed that security measures and troop presence remained high; People's Armed Police, local municipal police, and volunteer security personnel continuously patrolled the city. Most Urumqi residents we spoke to cautiously claimed that the overall security situation had stabilized in the last two weeks. A Uighur lawyer defending Uighurs accused of crimes linked to the July 5 riots shared that the trials are scheduled to continue over the next year. He characterized the trials as unfair due to the exclusion of lawyers from outside the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and because of government pressure on defense lawyers. These and other actions by the court and government in prosecuting these cases made presenting a credible defense impossible, he said. The Rebiya Kadeer Trade Tower remained closed, but was still standing. The Chinese government still had not lifted restrictions on communications -- including Internet access, texting, and international phone calls to or from the XUAR -- implemented following the July riots. Contacts did not know when these restrictions would be lifted. End Summary.


PRC's direct record of violent scenes:


A Xinjiang person's retrospective summary of "75 event".
Quote:
Number of casualties in the Seventh Five Year Plan
The official caliber is 197 people, which is said to prevent the intervention of the United Nations. According to a bill I don't know, the number of casualties is selected below that threshold. In fact, no one in the world should know the number of casualties. The special police army corps handles casualties separately without counting the number of casualties. There is no information exchange between different departments. At most, all departments know their own numbers and cannot know the total number. The only certainty is that the death toll is much higher than 197.

Revenge after the Seventh Five Year Plan
On July 7, the Han people organized a large-scale demonstration, and the armed police of the West Bridge established three lines of defense to prevent the Han people from passing through, which was finally broken through. After #deleted broke through, the subsequent retaliation was not effectively curbed. The government has issued a wanted notice, both Uyghur and Han people, and the number of Han people is not low. It is estimated that the retaliation of Han people is also terrible.

Enemies from the official
Around 2018 (the actual time may be earlier), the government (or the party committee?) arrested a group of ethnic minority officials, the most senior of which was a department-level official, who was rather mad. During the trial, he said, "Wait until Xinjiang Independence, I'm the President" or something like that. In addition, there is an appalling thing about Xinjiang Medical University. As a better medical college in Central Asia, many people will come to study. In 17 years, the president was arrested because one of his students first came to the United States after obtaining a doctorate, and then was confirmed to participate in ISIS.

My view on Islam and concentration camps (re education camps)
People are always immature and interested in strange things. I have simply read the Koran and the Bible. In contrast, the story of Islam makes me unable to like it and sympathize with people who are crazy about this religion. I still believe that Islam is highly exclusive and, to a certain extent, anti civilized. And I think (contrary to the mainstream opinion), the original intention of the establishment of concentration camps is good, and the follow-up implementation problem is not to mention. The incompetent government and failed implementation do not only exist in Xinjiang.

The people who first entered the concentration camp were those who received Scripture school education in extremely poor villages in southern Xinjiang. I found that when discussing concentration camps in the forum, we seldom talked about Scripture schools. If a group of people who have only received Islamic religious education (somewhat extreme), are teenagers, and have a hatred attitude towards the government and non Uyghur people (yes, Hui people are also included), if they are so laissez faire, considering that my family still lives in Xinjiang, I am not willing, which means that their life safety cannot be guaranteed. And if they are allowed to act, I think the Kunming railway station incident will happen again. In 2014, I just went to the mainland to study. I saw the morning market attack on the news. That morning market was the morning market my parents would go to. I'm glad my parents didn't go that day. Otherwise, I may have a hatred attitude towards Uighur and Islam now. #deleted

Another one:
Quote:
Two days after the July 5 incident, in fact, the July 7 incident also occurred, and the local Han retaliated on a large scale against the Uygurs.
A very impressive case is that a wife of Han nationality who was pregnant for several months was killed on July 5th, and then on July 7th, when he saw the Uyghur nationality, he cut down, killed two unrelated Uyghur nationalities, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Normally, killing two people indiscriminately was enough to be sentenced to death, and the sentence of life was already a relief, but at that time, the Internet was all scolding the judge for being a traitor, asking Uyghur people to pay blood for blood, and even start using illegal means to find the judge's personal information.

In addition to July 7th, a large number of Han people (reportedly 100000 people) marched in Urumqi to ask Wang Lequan, the then district party secretary, to go away. Although Wang Lequan did not go away immediately, he finally left ahead of schedule.

From these things, I think it can be seen that what Xi is really afraid of is not terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks are just a disease of scabies, and the Han nationalism stimulated by these things is a major problem. After all, most of the military and police at the grass-roots level are also Han people, which will inevitably be affected by Han nationalism. If Xi is dissatisfied to the extreme, he can really be overthrown. PS: when Xi first came to power, he was also pursuing a policy of appeasement. In order to show national unity, he also wore a white hat in the mosque. At that time, the speech control was not as severe as it is now, resulting in being scolded by extreme Han nationalists for three or two days, and scolding was very radical. It was not until the prohibition of Halal generalization and the initial results of Chen Quanguo's governance of Xinjiang that Xi's public opinion improved.


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28 Jul 2022, 1:52 pm

[高旭/Gao Xu] incident. 1980.
wikipedia, Chinese language.

Quote:
The gaoxu incident (also known as the southern Xinjiang incident) originated from a civil military conflict in Yecheng County, Xinzang highway, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on August 2, 1980. During the conflict between the two sides, Gao Xu, a soldier of the people's Liberation Army, shot and killed a Uygur youth.The Party committee of the Urumqi military region and the Party committee of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region decided that Gao Xu should be sentenced to death without trial in order to appease the Uygur people.In mid September, the military court of Urumqi military region tried Gao Xu at the southern Xinjiang Military Region Headquarters in Shule County, and announced his death sentence on September 16. This result aroused the dissatisfaction and anger of the local army officers and soldiers and the Han people, triggered the attacks of the masses on the judges, and led to mass incidents.
Before the incident, Xinjiang Uygur criminals attacked the Han people continuously, and military officers and soldiers were also the targets of attack. The continuous attacks have caused continuous tension between the Uyghur and Han nationalities. However, the local judicial authorities did not effectively punish such Uygur criminals, and even major criminal cases were still lightly sentenced. After the incident, the central government changed its ethnic policy, which was later widely known as the "两个离不开" thought.


Internal reference from Xinhua News Agency (China's core official media). Chinese language.
Quote:
In mid September, shortly after the end of the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress, a shocking "Gao Xu incident" occurred in southern Xinjiang, which violated socialist democracy and the legal system. The reporter witnessed and investigated the incident.

The truth
On August 2, 1980, under the leadership of deputy battalion commander zouzhaowen and instructor zhaochengbiao, the 6th company of the 11th automobile regiment of the Logistics Department of Urumqi military region went to the Ali Region of Tibet to perform tasks and returned to Xinjiang. At about 5:00 p.m., when the motorcade arrived at the desolate selike Daban (218 kilometers away from the Xinjiang Tibet highway), a battle soil found four yaks at the foot of the mountain. They mistakenly believed that they were wild yaks. With the approval of zouzhaowen, the deputy battalion commander who led the team, the instructor zhaochengbiao (arrested, handled separately) led Gao Xu and others to shoot and kill two of them. After being killed, they found that there were traces of rope tied on the yak, so they knew it was not a wild yak.

When they were peeling leather, they were found by people on a passing car and reported to the road maintenance team 14 kilometers ahead (the shepherd responsible for herding the four yaks was also here). The herdsman was frightened to cry when he heard that the yak was killed. He asked the road maintenance workers to help intercept the vehicles. The road maintenance workers set up roadblocks and sent three people to stop the car in three different sections in front of the roadblocks.

At 11:20 that night, when Gao Xu's car arrived at the No. 204 road shift, someone waved in the light of the headlights and heard the cries of "stop" and "get down". They thought someone wanted a ride and ignored it. They continued to drive forward and passed the barricade placed by workers with stones and logs. When the workers saw that the car was not stopping, they smashed the windshield of the car with shovel and stones. Apizi Abdullah, a road maintenance worker, jumped on the left pedal and competed with the driver for the steering wheel, forcing the car to swing left and right, rushing 270 meters out of the barricade and stopping. At this time, another car Zhao Chengbiao took also rushed to the scene and forcibly rushed over the barricade. The workers smashed the car with stones again. Zhao got out of the car, first pulled out the empty gun (submachine gun) threat, and then fired a warning in the air. It didn't work. Some people continued to rush at the car and smashed it. So Gao Xu asked for a submachine gun from Zhao's hand and fired three volleys at the road maintenance workers. Apizi Abdullah was killed on the spot, and Gao drove away from the scene. When he arrived at the Kudi military station, Gao Xu took the initiative to tell the deputy battalion commander truthfully that he fired and hit at least one person. At 0:50 on August 3, the deputy battalion commander who led the team reported to Yecheng County Public Security Bureau by telephone.

Gao Xu shot and killed the masses, causing great indignation among the relatives of the victims and the Uyghur people in southern Xinjiang. The unit where the deceased belonged was preparing to carry the corpse for a procession. The party committees of the Urumqi military region and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region attach great importance to this and believe that it is serious and must be dealt with seriously. The Urumqi military region sent a joint investigation team to southern Xinjiang on August 6. The Party committee of the Urumqi military region and the Party committee of the autonomous region were eager to stabilize the mood of the Uygur people. Before the case was fully investigated, the military procuratorate had not prosecuted, and the court had not accepted it, they jointly sent a message to the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission on August 12, suggesting that Gao Xu be "sentenced to death and executed immediately". On August 18, the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission approved and agreed with the opinions of the Party committee of the Urumqi military region and the Party committee of the autonomous region. On August 21, tanyoulin, political commissar of Urumqi military region, delivered a speech at the third level cadre meeting held in Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Referring to Gao Xu's case, he said: "the murderer has been detained. The Party committee of the autonomous region and the Party committee of the military region have asked the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission for instructions, and are ready to be sentenced to death by the military court and executed immediately in accordance with legal procedures. The families of the deceased and the local people are satisfied with such treatment." Then, Tan Youlin's speech was printed into documents, together with other documents of the third cadre meeting, which were sent to all parts of Xinjiang and conveyed to the army and all local cadres and masses. People have raised questions: "are officials more powerful or laws more powerful?" "Why do we need the court when the Party Committee directly tries cases?" "Why should the military region and autonomous region Party committees intervene when the Fifth National People's Congress emphasizes the independent trial of the court?" After tanyoulin's speech was conveyed to Gao Xu's army, the reaction was even stronger. Some people say that it is impossible to exchange the head of a soldier for national unity! People in factories, schools and institutions in Kashgar also expressed dissatisfaction with Tan Youlin's speech.

After the investigation team of Gao Xu's case returned to Urumqi, the Party committee of Urumqi military region instructed the judicial department of the military region to deal with Gao Xu's case as soon as possible. When the military procuratorate prosecuted and the military court tried Gao Xu's case, most people disagreed with the immediate execution of the death penalty based on all the facts of the case investigated and verified. The judicial department reported its opinions to the relevant leading comrades, and the answer was: the Party committee has decided, the Central Committee has approved, resolutely implement it, and we should hold a court trial in the southern Xinjiang Military Region as soon as possible.

In order to ensure that the case of Gao Xu was handled according to the opinions of the Party committee and to carry out organizational and disciplinary education for the troops, the Party committee of the Urumqi military region sent Wei Youzhu, deputy political commissar of the military region and director of the political department, to lead the judicial staff to Southern Xinjiang to implement the judgments of the two party committees against Gao Xu. At the same time, more than 40 leading cadres from units above the division level of the military region were summoned to the southern Xinjiang Military Region to attend the trial of Gao Xu and hold an on-site meeting on the spot.

After Wei Youzhu and his party arrived in southern Xinjiang, many people told them not to sentence Gao Xu to death and execute immediately. If we adhere to the decision of the Party committee, we will not only not ease the ethnic contradictions, but may further intensify the contradictions and cause greater chaos. However, they underestimated the serious situation in southern Xinjiang at that time, and did not listen to different opinions. In order to ensure that the trial can proceed smoothly according to the opinions of the two party committees, they worked as jurors and lawyers respectively. The jurors' thoughts are not coordinated, and the organization obeys the arrangement; The lawyer said "I will not embarrass the court".

Court debate
On September 15, the Criminal Court of the military court of Urumqi military region held a trial of Gao Xu amid protests. This morning, the audience was full. Two hours after the court session, more than 200 soldiers who were not approved to participate in the audit outside the court had a dispute with the guard, attacked the guard and rushed into the court. Before the trial resumed at 3:30 p.m., when the approved audit representatives came to the venue, the seats had been occupied by more than 1000 soldiers and local people. The presiding judge was forced to announce an adjournment. The reason is that there are too many unauthorized observers to ensure the order of the court and the normal progress of the trial. Suddenly, the court was in an uproar. People came to ask:

Since it's a trial, why are you afraid of many people? We haven't violated the court discipline. Why don't we allow the audience?

After asking for instructions from the superior, the court session continued at 10 a.m. on September 16 for court debate.

Prosecutor stressed, "the defendant Gao Xu, as a soldier of the people's Liberation Army, should have exemplary implementation of our army's purpose, consciously abide by the three major disciplines and eight points of attention, love the people, and protect the interests of the masses. However, they ignored the national law and military discipline, when the masses stopped their vehicles to solve the problem of killing yaks, they did not ask for reasons, made subjective assumptions, and misjudged the situation. When the vehicle exceeded the barricade by 270 meters and the personal safety was not seriously threatened, it turned out that after Zhao Chengbiao fired a gun into the air, he asked for a submachine gun from Zhao's hand to shoot at the masses, killing the worker apizi Abdullah, which seriously damaged national unity and military civilian relations, and his behavior constituted the crime of intentional homicide. "

The first question raised by the lawyer to the prosecutor is: is this trial a first instance or a second instance? He believed that the case had been tried half a month ago, and a larger "judge" announced the judgment. Then he read Tan Youlin's speech at the third cadre meeting of the autonomous region about the immediate execution of Gao Xu's death sentence.

The prosecutor didn't answer, but the presiding judge replied, "Tan's speech is true, but this court acts according to legal procedures. If you have any opinions on the law enforcement of this court, you can submit them to the higher court."

The lawyer raised the second question: the system of examining and approving cases by the Party committee has been abolished. Does the decision of the two party committees have any effect on the court? The presiding judge replied: this court is not subject to any external interference.

Then, the lawyer and the prosecutor debated the motive of Gao Xu's murder and the nature of his crime. In his defense, the lawyer held that:

1. There is no inevitable causal relationship between Gao Xu's accidental shooting of domestic yaks and shooting and killing. The reasons are: (1) he didn't know it was a domestic yak when shooting yaks; (2) The cattle hunting place is 14 kilometers away from the intercepting vehicle, and there are no yak herders or people who come to look for yaks on the way; (3) When the road workers stopped and smashed the car, they did not mention the yak.

2. Gao Xu's shooting was caused by the other party's illegal infringement. The road shift workers set up obstacles on the road at will, violating the relevant provisions of the urban and highway traffic management rules; Road maintenance workers smashed cars and forcibly hit the steering wheel, which constituted illegal violations; The defendant shot because the illegal infringement he suffered did not stop, but was in progress.

3. He misjudged the situation and regarded the road maintenance workers as the bad guys who plotted the riot. There are objective reasons for the defendant's wrong judgment: (1) the defendant is the first time to perform a task in Ali and is not familiar with the situation along the way; (2) Driving in the wilderness in the middle of the night, he was nervous when he encountered a situation: (3) he was actually attacked illegally; (4) The situation is sudden and the time is short, so there is no time to make a correct judgment; (5) Influenced by the wrong judgment of others in the same industry - the driver of Gao Xu's car once shouted "mob" when he was stopped; (6) The instructor zhaochengbiao pulled the empty gun first, and then fired the gun in the air. It was an inspiration to shoot the defendant. Before the defendant learned that the victim was a road maintenance worker, he always thought it was right to shoot.

Based on the above facts, the lawyer concluded that the nature of Gao Xu's murder should be "excessive self-defense", rather than intentional murder. In addition, Gao Xu vividly confessed his crime before and after his arrest, without shifting blame and overturning the case, and had a good attitude of confession, which constituted a lighter punishment.

In the debate of more than two hours, the audience booed and applauded as many as 17 times. Among them, Gao Xu applauded five times when he defended himself. Around 11:00, more than 300 people, mostly soldiers, asked to attend the court. The deputy chief of staff of the southern Xinjiang Military Region, who was responsible for maintaining order, was spit on his face and received several punches. Seeing the situation unfavourably, he hurriedly made the door of the venue stand against him. People outside the door slammed the door together, and finally opened it and swarmed in.

At 12:30, the court debate ended.

At 13:00, when the collegiate bench (composed of the presiding judge and two jurors) was deliberating, there were differences of opinion within it. The two jurors who had done a good job changed their minds after listening to the debate. They did not agree to sentence Gao Xu to death and immediately executed him. One refuses to sign; One signed reservation. After two and a half hours of collegial discussion, no consensus has been reached. It is reasonable to say that such a situation can no longer be sentenced. However, the court asked Wei Youzhu, deputy political commissar of the Urumqi military region, to order the sentencing as originally planned by the trial committee. During the collegiate session, people did not bother to eat and waited for the final judgment with bated breath.

The crowd was furious
At 15:30 on September 16, the court held a court session to read out the judgment. When the presiding judge read that Gao Xu was "sentenced to death in accordance with the law and executed immediately", the words didn't fall, and the crowd was angry, "we don't agree, we don't agree!" The roar of shook the hall one after another. Gaoxu, the prisoner, had just been taken away. The presiding judge hurriedly took off his glasses, pulled down his hat brim and slipped away through the back door. At this time, some people thought they were going to tie Gao Xu to the execution ground and shoot him, so they shouted, "go and save Gao Xu!" Qi rushed to the detention center. After breaking through the first gate, Li Yulu, a cadre of the court of the southern Xinjiang Military Region, and Yang Maosheng, the officer of the cadre office were beaten. Then several soldiers took the lead to break through the second door, pulled Gao Xu away from the monitor, and walked out of the courtyard of the southern Xinjiang military region surrounded by hundreds of people, came to the cross street, and got on a military truck that had already been prepared. At this time, a dozen Uygur youths, seeing Gao Xu being robbed, risked their lives to climb on the hood of the car and in front of the wheels, blocking the way. Unable to escape and hide, people took Gao Xu back to the organ courtyard of the southern Xinjiang Military Region and occupied the military region guesthouse. Until 8 p.m., unable to find a suitable place, Gao Xu and his sister persuaded a group of soldiers without hats to return Gao Xu to the detention center.

While trying to protect the criminals, people fought against the pedestrians who came to try Gao Xu. What they hate most is the presiding judge, who claims to throw him down from the upstairs and skin him alive. A crowd of dozens of soldiers with their collars and hats torn off as the backbone searched the headquarters building of the southern Xinjiang Military Region door to door. The secret document room and the secret room were opened, all the houses were searched, and finally there were only two battle command rooms left. Wei Youzhu, who was hiding here, and hehuazhang, deputy director of the Logistics Department of the Urumqi military region, Wang Jinchi, the presiding judge, Wei zhoujian, the prosecutor, and Dong Jian all became nervous. The leading cadres of the southern Xinjiang Military Region hurriedly called Tan Youlin in Urumqi. Tan was also at a loss and asked them to find a way by themselves. Just as the door of the battle room of the headquarters was about to be opened, mahongshan, the political commissar of the southern Xinjiang Military Region, lied that "the superior called, and there was a new spirit to convey", and led several leaders to a room on the second floor, diverting people's attention, and several talents who hid inside saved their lives.
...
These two days, the office building and detention center of the military region have become "bazaar" (Uyghur: market), and men, women and children can enter and leave freely. Many people brought old hens, eggs, wine, cans and fruits to the detention center to visit Gao Xu and asked Gao Xu to make a speech in public. Gao's speech mainly introduced the process of crime and - again - dissuaded people from attacking the prison. During the speech, some people applauded and shouted, "Gao Xu, you are a hero of the Han!" Gao replied, "I'm not a hero, I'm a criminal."

After September 19, after the efforts of the military and local leaders at all levels, a lot of work was done, especially after the reply of the PLA military court and the Supreme People's court, the storm gradually subsided.

A thing has its cause
The emergence of "Gao Xu incident" is not accidental, but has its profound social background.

Since the Aksu incident on April 11th, 1980, some Uygur youths have been making trouble, the military civilian and ethnic contradictions in southern Xinjiang have gradually worsened, the national opposition has deepened, and various events have followed. Some of them scold Han people when they see them, some beat Han people with air guns, slingshots, stones and clods for no reason, some flirt with and molest Han women in broad daylight, and even gang rape Han women. According to the statistics of Kashgar Public Security Bureau, in the criminal cases investigated and dealt with in the whole city from January to August 1980, there were 25 cases in which the Han people were beaten without reason, including 2 deaths and 13 serious injuries. Not enough criminal punishment occurs almost every day. Some schools and units cannot go to work normally, and cars are often blocked. Of the more than 700 drivers of the sixth transportation company of the autonomous region in Kashgar, more than 200 drivers and their families were intercepted and beaten. In a traffic accident, as long as one party is Han, he will not ask for reasons and go up and beat him up. Han drivers reacted strongly to this. Starting from improving national unity, the army stressed the need to "fight back and scold back". Some Uygur youths regard this as weak and easy to bully. Army soldiers have become their main targets of attack, and many commanders and fighters are beaten and scolded outside.

It is worth noting that no one dares to care about these things. Whoever wants to intervene or say a fair word, he will rush forward and beat him up. Therefore, the scale of the trouble is getting larger and larger, and the situation is becoming more and more serious. On June 26, more than 400 Uyghur people stormed the barracks of the troops stationed in Atush (border defense 11th regiment), injured 34 cadres and soldiers, and stole a lot of military supplies. They also chanted slogans and demonstrated for four consecutive days, injuring eight Army soldiers, 164 local Han people and smashing eight cars. On August 10, in Yecheng, Chen Genfa, a soldier of the 5th company of the 29th automobile regiment, drove over and killed a Uyghur child crossing the road. Hundreds of Uyghur people carried their bodies and marched, shouting "down with the Han people"; "Black coat(disparaging name for Han), Get out of Xinjiang!" And other slogans, the father of the deceased and two Uygur directors and deputy directors of Yecheng County Public Security Bureau were also injured due to dissuasion. Then, on August 29, in Shule County, Bai Yinhui, the driver of the hydrological corps of the infrastructure engineering corps, was besieged by Uyghur people. He fired a warning shot to the ground, injuring a Uyghur people with a bullet. More than 1000 Uyghur people took the opportunity to make trouble, injuring 58 troops and local Han people, and smashing four cars.

The continuous occurrence of this incident has seriously affected the social security and production order in southern Xinjiang Some criminals are domineering, and they don't get the punishment they deserve, so they don't end up. There is resentment in the hearts of Han cadres and the masses. The public security and judicial departments not only failed to crack down on the above-mentioned cases, but also failed to make fair judgments on many major criminal cases according to the law. The Uyghur people committed crimes and were sentenced lightly for many felonies, which further aroused the strong dissatisfaction of the Han people. On March 26, a retired old worker at the big cross store of Kashgar City Bureau of Commerce was killed on the spot because he interfered with nurmaimaiti, a worker of the second Geological Brigade of the autonomous region, who scolded the Han people for no reason. On August 5, the municipal court sentenced only nine years. On January 18, Rong Lingen, an employee of the 42nd farm of the Nongken regiment and a psychotic, was killed alive by Yu Sufu Wu Buli of the 12th brigade of xiamalibak commune in Kashgar because he knocked on the door of the Uygur people. On May 12, the municipal court sentenced him to only 10 years' imprisonment.

This series of problems made the cadres and the masses of Han nationality feel unfair, so they were angry, and the opposition became more and more serious, just like firewood and other fires. In this case, dealing with the "gaoxu incident" did not follow legal procedures, and the sentence was too heavy (sentenced to death, immediately executed), which became the kindling of the fire, and finally broke out this appalling "gaoxu incident".

The Aksu incident is mentioned here. Wikipedia. Chinese language.
Quote:
Since the spring of 1980, the situation in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has become tense...Aksu "4.9" incident is one of the earliest and largest unrest events.

On April 9, 1980, Huang Zhen (Han), criminal policeman of Aksu County Public Security Bureau, seriously violated the discipline, and put yaolewas Tohti, a Uygur urban resident who was drunk and made trouble in the street, into the duty room of Aksu County Public Security Bureau. In order to stop yaolewas Tohti shouting and making trouble, he handcuffed him and blocked his mouth with a towel, causing yaolewas Tohti to suffocate and die. Huang Zhen was immediately arrested.

After the incident, from April 10 to 11, 1980, some Uighurs took the incident as an excuse, saying that it was "the government's persecution of Uighurs", shouting "blood for blood" and "overthrow the black coat government" ("black coat" is a term used by Uighurs for the Han people). At their call, more than 3000 Uighur people carried corpses and marched, publicly shouting "overthrow black coat" Slogans such as "Han people go back to the pass" attacked more than a dozen units such as the Aksu prefectural Party committee of the Communist Party of China, the Aksu County Public Security Bureau, Daguang wool textile factory, and the Agricultural Bank of China, and robbed property and chased the Han cadres and masses. 155 party and government cadres were beaten. The main slogans are "carry out the Islamic Revolution to the end", "defeat the infidels" and "long live the Islamic Republic". Finally, 86 people were admitted and 10 were prosecuted.

According to official statistics, in the "serious beating, smashing and looting riots", one Han was killed and 549 Han people were injured, of which 93 were seriously injured.

No one planned the incident for a long time in advance, but more than 3000 people easily gathered when the incident occurred.
...
After the incident...According to the Xinjiang Daily, at that time, senior leaders also instructed when passing through Urumqi that Han cadres who entered Xinjiang in 1949 and the early days of the founding of the people's Republic of China had completed the task of helping Xinjiang's ethnic minorities build border areas and could return to the mainland.


A Uygur official's view on the Gao Xu incident. link. Chinese language.
Quote:
With the approval of the Central Military Commission, the military court sentenced Gao Xu to death, and a vice president of the military court came to Nanjiang to personally supervise the execution. The charge is: it is illegal for Gao Xu and others to shoot yaks. The victims and others stopped the car and claimed for compensation. Although the method is inappropriate, it is not a big mistake. Gao Xu's shooting, although misjudged, was still an indirect intentional killing. Unexpectedly, thousands of Han people robbed the execution ground and hid Gao Xu. Under the strong pressure of the Han people, the military court sentenced Gao Xu to 15 years' imprisonment.

It has been 10 years since this incident. What I didn't expect is that such a deep scar has been seared in the hearts of Uyghur people. Up to now, it is still difficult to calm down their anger. Uygur director asked me, "is it illegal to hijack the execution ground?" I said, "if what you said is true, it is certainly illegal. But I really don't know what you said. It's the first time I heard it." "Why don't we deal with violations of the law? Why do Han people dare to rob the court after killing us Uygurs and sentenced to death? Is this fair?!" "If it's Uyghur hijacking, the soldiers will certainly shoot, and it will definitely be characterized as a counter revolutionary riot."


External network, the evaluation of a PRC citizen. link
Quote:
As a Han, we must recognize one thing, that is, if selling the interests of Han people can calm the anger of the minority people, CPC will do it without hesitation.

If the CPC chooses to suppress, it must be because the Han people have nothing to sell anymore.


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30 Jul 2022, 1:07 am

I checked the recent developments of a Uighur, 20 years old, on the internal network.
In order to avoid causing him trouble, I don't release his social media links.

What he implied in social media:
A)Shaving is not allowed in southern Xinjiang. A beard that has not been shaved for more than a month will make the police intervene and ask for shaving. (others added that it is allowed in Northern Xinjiang. And this action does not distinguish ethnic groups.)
B)He believed that his father had been framed. His father lost his freedom around April and died around May. He did not disclose more information.
C)Uighurs(Or all residents of Xinjiang?) are currently subject to stricter family planning restrictions than other parts of China's present situation. (although it is still more relaxed than the Han in the past)
D)The original text "foreign media use wages and working hours to demonstrate that those guys have been abused. But foreign media did not expect that in fact, normal people are such wages and working hours."
E)The original text "CCP has indeed made us live a good life, but compared with bad things, the proportion of these things in our after dinner conversation is very low."
F)The official in charge of Xinjiang was changed. All residents in Xinjiang are happy about this. This means that restrictions are likely to be reduced.
G)He is now dissatisfied with the government. But he worried that these contents would be weaponized by the western media.
H)From another Uighur they are familiar with: the unemployed Uighurs he knows will ask to enter the "vocational skills education school" to get the jobs assigned after that. Others asked him whether the "large-scale learning"(suggestive terms for circumventing censorship) had made Uighur men fail in the workplace. He believed that this actually helped the Uyghur at the bottom.

He used to be quite nationalistic (for PRC) and patriotic. He and his father are both imams. After his father died, he no longer trusted CCP, but refused to betray China.
He believes that the officials he hates are as hateful as the Uighurs who harm their compatriots overseas(extreme religion/nationalism or untrue description, I guess).

His thoughts on the 75 incident:
It has brought great harm to the Uighurs. However, both the photos he viewed and what he witnessed at that time, the Han people were the most killed.


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30 Jul 2022, 3:10 am

Translation of debates on Xinjiang issue and China's democratization in the external online Chinese community.

Quote:
OP: I think after the liberalization of public opinion, liberals may be completely suppressed by conservatives on the Xinjiang issue.

I sympathize with the experience of Uighurs very much. Mass detention and forced detention are very bad, but after careful consideration, I think that after the release of public opinion, statements like me are likely to be a minority in the national public opinion field.

First of all, many Han liberals sympathize with the Uighurs now, because judging from the scale of mutual harm in recent years, the harm done by the Communist Party of China to the Uighurs is far greater than the harm done by the Uighurs to the Communist Party of China.

Uighurs' harm to Han people, such as the terrorist attacks of the July 5 incident and the murder of people in Kunming railway station, all add up to thousands of people; On the contrary, the number of Uighurs injured, that is, the number of students in the "re education camp" is much higher than this (the specific number is unknown, but I think it is at least six digits).

Let's imagine what will happen if public opinion is released? The liberalization of public opinion will inevitably be accompanied by various liberalization measures, and the intensity of control will be greatly reduced. Many Uighurs will certainly seek revenge (especially those who have gone to the re education camp). I think 99% of them will have a large-scale terrorist attack, and small-scale terrorist attacks will also occur frequently. Like the American shooting, the probability of making headlines every week is not small. If there is no military pressure, There may even be retaliatory genocide of Uyghur against Han.

So the question is, when the domestic people see that Uighurs frequently launch terrorist attacks, what do you think people in the mainland will think of Uighurs? What do you think? For example, a Uighur terrorist went to Nanjing Road Walkway in Shanghai or Xidan in Beijing. A bomb attack killed dozens of hundreds of people, and even killed more than 1700 people like 7.5 (many people think this number is conservative). At that time, people in the mainland are expected to gnash their teeth at Uighurs, let alone 7.5, Kunming railway station and other events, This sub group has been allowed to support the practice of the Communist Party of China in Xinjiang, even if this sub group has been regarded as one of the most liberal communities in China.

I think one of the reasons why the relationship between Han-Hui and Han-Manchu in China is OK is that everyone has slaughtered each other on a large scale in history, so it's all over. For example, the Manchus once slaughtered Han people in Jiading on the 10th day of Yangzhou, and the Han people also slaughtered Manchus crazily when the Qing Dynasty perished. But if, not long after the freedom of public opinion, the Uyghur launched terrorist attacks because of the humiliation of re education camps and other policies, we liberals may be able to understand a little. For the vast majority of mainlanders (there are not only Han people here, but also Zhuang, Manchu and other highly sinicized ethnic minorities), because of the information blockade of the Communist Party of China, they do not know the previous experience of the Uyghur, in their perspective, I only see a group of extremist Islamists who, despite taking a lot of benefits from being a minority, have killed indiscriminately since more than ten or twenty years ago, allowing mainlanders to be slaughtered unilaterally by Uygurs. In this case, mainlanders must demand revenge on Uygurs, not to mention giving up Xinjiang to allow the latter to become independent.

Secondly, CCP's high pressure also suppressed Han nationalism and various conspiracy theory groups.

CCP is full of vigilance towards all things that can form self-organization, and pursues extreme and abnormal stability. Except for the Party committee, no association is allowed. Even LGBT's gay pride festival must be suppressed, and the same is true for Han nationalist groups. But after the public opinion is released? All this repression will no longer exist, and at that time, all kinds of false and provocative news will also be rampant.

In a comprehensive comparison with the United States, the United States is far superior to China in terms of economic development, population education and population diversification; From the practice of democracy and freedom, Americans have played a Democratic Republic for more than 200 years; Historically, the evil done by American whites to blacks and Indians, in terms of time span and the number of casualties, is far greater than the evil done by CCP to Uighurs, not to mention that the United States has never done such a harmful thing as CCP's family planning to Han people to whites, its main ethnic group.

In this case, the white people in the United States should be generally more liberal, and the general nationalism is weak. However, this is by no means the case. Many white people are white nationalists, or at least they are not disgusted with the element of white supremacy. This can be seen from the two general elections of Trump. If so many white people are disgusted with white supremacy, they will not vote for Trump.

In particular, under the constant publicity of Fox News and other right-wing media, many whites have a feeling of "I've given you so many benefits and apologies so many times, and the affective action has given you so many discounts. Why are you so shameless" for minorities such as blacks, and many whites feel that they are discriminated against in reverse (although judging from the proportion of whites in senior executives, congressmen, etc., there is no evidence that whites are discriminated against in reverse)

Imagine that in a China with complete freedom of speech, there is a tucker Carlson like figure who accuses CCP of genocide against the Han people because of its family planning against the Han people; The three-year famine genocided Henan, Sichuan and Anhui; We don't know how many mainlanders died in the cultural revolution, the three evils and the five evils, the crackdown, and the reeducation through labor system; After that, the Han people will be discriminated against in the college entrance examination. Zhuang and Manchu nationalities are obviously no different from the Han people in all aspects of living habits and language. There are also 70-80% of the Han people's blood on the chromosome, because the nationality on the ID card can add five points, Uighurs are even more exaggerated. Many Uighurs can enter top universities. Their scores, if they are Han, are estimated to be only able to go to a second-class University; Han people are also discriminated against when they become civil servants. For example, 70% of Guangxi Mingming are Han people, but the chairman of the autonomous region must be Zhuang; Finally, on TV: why didn't your western officials speak for our Han people at the beginning? Why not charge genocide against our Han people? Where were you during the Henan famine? Why should we be punished because of Xinjiang? Why didn't you punish us for the Henan famine and force the CCP to improve human rights in Henan? Why do Uighurs want independence because they are persecuted? We Han people haven't said anything yet?

There is no doubt that this "we knelt, So you have to kneel down "is a very funny logic, but on the one hand, the persecution of Han people in history is indeed very tragic. On the other hand, although they are all main ethnic groups, Han people can't be directly compared with whites (if the relationship between main ethnic groups and minorities in the world is like that between whites and blacks, then 95% of ethnologists on the earth can lose their jobs) Some western media like to compare Han people to white people in their reports, which aggravates Han people's antipathy to the West. Therefore, this script must attract many ordinary people.

In addition, this Chinese Tucker Carlson kept advocating the threat of Islam on TV, and invited the victims of the July 5 incident, the murder of Kunming railway station, the terrorist attack in Urumqi south station and their families to visit on TV at any time; At the same time, they kept inciting, snapping and taking out of context, such as deliberately sending people to take pictures of Uyghur people praying piously in the mosque, or Uyghur women wrapped tightly, in order to incite everyone, "the west of Xi'an is going to be Islamized! "Allah is going to rule China! "Some people may not be moved, but what about more people? Will they listen to these rumors?

We must not forget that the leaders of the Uyghur movement overseas, such as those at the World Uyghur Congress, have always advocated the independence of Xinjiang. This advocate has been going on for more than ten years, long before the CCP started to conduct re-education camps, or even earlier. Before a series of terrorist attacks in 2009-14.
These Uyghur leaders generally have an anti Han attitude (although they have played down this attitude in order to solicit funds from NED and CIA and win international sympathy). Many Uyghur people have made anti Han, anti China and pro Chinese separatist remarks.
If Hong Kong people shout zhi-word to mainlanders, it will make mainlanders generally dislike Hong Kong people, and even many anti CCP people are angry. Once the Internet is fully opened, the abuse of Uygur activists on Twitter to Han/Chinese has been seen by ordinary people. What do you think will be the thoughts of ordinary Chinese people?

It is also worth mentioning the role of conspiracy theory in later liberal China. Even in developed countries such as Britain and the United States, 40% to 50% of the population believe in at least one conspiracy theory. Half of the Republicans of qanon's conspiracy theory, which sounds ridiculous, believe that the United States has even elected a congressman like majorie Taylor Greene (the congressman once said that the fire in California was caused by Jewish lasers, think about it). If China's public opinion is liberalized, how widely will conspiracy theories about Muslims spread in China? How many anti Muslim councilors will be elected? And how will the anti Muslim public opinion triggered by these conspiracy theories in turn affect the authorities?

In a word, although public opinion may sympathize with Uyghur at present, it is very weak. In the future, public opinion will really be relaxed. As long as the external security environment changes slightly and there are a few terrorist attacks, public opinion on Uyghur is likely to reverse in an instant, The potential "authoritarian personality" in the depths of human heart is very strong, and the tribalism of "not our race, its heart must be different" is the mainstream, not to mention that terrorist attacks are indeed a problem.

zhi-word: It originated from the discriminatory appellation of the Japanese to the Chinese during WWII.
Later, it was used by Chinese speakers with different opinions (including a small number of Mainland Chinese ) to discriminate against people in Mainland Chinese.

Thread A:
Quote:
This sub really idealizes democracy. Like, India elected modi. He used to be a member of RSS and supported heavy blows against Muslims. Isn't it democracy? Is there anything wrong with procedural justice in Modi? Because of the high value of cooperation, it is not convenient for the west to report more about it. It would be too funny to say that we are not worthy of democracy after democracy in China.

Quote:
What you are saying is that in fact, leaders like modi are the mainstream in the world. The "white left" leaders in the West rule countries with a combined population of less than 1 billion, that is, about 10-12% of the population of the earth.

Quote:
Yes, modi is in power with extreme Hindu nationalism. He is elected for two consecutive terms. Advocating hatred is too easy to win.


Thread B:
Quote:
You may have made a mistake: the problems in Xinjiang will explode with the economy, not a "discovery of conscience". Liberals or conservatives cannot violate the objective law.
Compared with cynicism, liberals have the upper hand, which is conducive to stop losses. The external environment will be more friendly, and there is still the possibility that internal contradictions will not end in extreme conflicts.

Chinese people or people from other countries who really have conscience on public issues are in the minority. The problem now is that intellectuals who should represent conscience are either silenced or bribed, and the society will be polarized.

Quote:
What does "will explode with the economy" mean?

Quote:
This set of control over 20million people in Xinjiang requires a lot of resources. In the period of economic downturn, it will only become more and more difficult until it becomes unsustainable. And people have memories.

Thread C:
Quote:
A key problem here is that there are not many exchanges between Uyghur and Han people. Blacks in the United States, Muslims in Europe, and even Hui and main ethnic groups in eastern China are mixed, so in reality, we can feel a lot of conflicts of interest. The popularity of white supremacy cannot be said to be a response to the stimulation of practical interests.

But Uyghur is different. Uyghur people live in a corner of Xinjiang. Except for those who sell roast mutton kebabs on the street, you can't see Uyghur people at all. Which Chinese city has Uyghur populated areas and Uyghur mosques. Are there Uyghur students who wear black hoods to school in your children's class? In fact, the reason why Uyghur people incur this level of repression is that they have made many terrorist attacks against ordinary Han people in the mainland in the past 13-14 years. Of course, there was also a terrorist attack against Xi's Urumqi. Before that, East Turkistan was much more ruthless in Xinjiang in the 1990s, and the 75 incident was also very cruel, but to be honest, there were not many feelings from mainland people.

Quote:
The problem is that there are also tens of millions of Han people in Xinjiang. I think even if their terrorists don't go to the mainland, just doing things in Xinjiang can make the online Han collective climax.

Quote:
The mainland doesn't know much about the 75 incident because there is no large-scale report at all.

Quote:
Those incidents were blocked by CCP because they were afraid that the Han people in the mainland would discriminate against Uighurs and maintain stability.

Quote:
After the 75 incident, the network in Xinjiang was interrupted for a year.


Thread D:
Quote:
An excellent keyboard politics!!

In fact, I knew what the CPC did in Xinjiang long ago. I once met a Pakistani uncle who married a Uyghur woman when traveling in Kashgar. His son was arrested. He had been looking for a son for half a year (after so many years, I hope the uncle's son has gone home and reformed).

People who have been to and carefully observed the fragmentation of the ethnic groups in southern Xinjiang should know. Even the local street shops in Yining are on the Han side and on the minority side, and do not interact with each other.

What the BBC said is partly true, but there is no way. Because extreme religions are the target of attack all over the world, their evil deeds can only pay more costs and shed more blood by conventional means. Before the 75 incident, Han people in some villages in southern Xinjiang were slaughtered by the whole village, and even the minority people felt that this was intolerable.
...
Those extremist religious elements and separatists who received American money kidnapped the minority people in the name of Allah and the lives of Muslims.

The national territory of the world has been difficult to change today. How difficult is it for the mainland to recover Taiwan? It's as difficult as climbing the sky. Xinjiang's independence is more difficult than human migration to Mars.

The problem is not CCP. The minority people must be clear that the Han nationality and the minority people are a community of interests. We are all in one country, one prosperous, and prosper together. If China is destroyed, the life of ethnic minorities will only fall into the abyss.

Extreme Han nationalists? What is the difference between extreme Han nationalists and ethnic extremist religious elements? Huanghan was unreasonably climaxed by we media, which did not know which money it received, creating national confrontation. In the constitution, these are the targets of the government!

Quote:
"Before the 75 incident, Han people in some villages in southern Xinjiang were slaughtered by the whole village"
Is there any source?

Quote:
I'm not reading media news. The locals told me.


Thread E:
Quote:
What OP said is very realistic. We are really helpless.
If China really democratizes, it needs to distinguish between sudden democratization and democratization in a transitional stage.
If it was the former, large-scale ethnic violence and bloodshed would probably be unavoidable. Sheng Shicai, a warlord in Xinjiang, was transferred. Then in the so-called "Three Zone revolution", the Han people in Ili were indiscriminately purged before they could escape.

If it is a gradual democratization process, it may be a relatively smooth transition, but the new government must also bear the accounts of the CCP, and need to apologize and compensate. Xinjiang must demand independence. Once the new government compromises excessively, it will be labeled as a traitor, and the powerful will take the opportunity to take power again, and the result will return to the state of conflict.

The ethnic issues in the border areas must be an important obstacle to the democratization of China in the future, although they are rarely discussed by the people.

The other is to support the CCP to the end, adhere to the current policy for two generations, and the hatred will become lighter with time. The Soviet Union has also engaged in large-scale ethnic persecution, but the Soviet Union lasted long enough. After the collapse of the 1990s, things during WWII have been blurred.

If democratization is inevitable, then the independence of Xinjiang and Tibet is inevitable. The realistic way is how to retain the best interests after the independence of the two places. I think the northern Xinjiang should be preserved, the southern Xinjiang can be allowed to be independent, and Tibet can be independent, but the Tibetan areas in the four provinces should stay. There is also the need to strengthen the close ties between Xinjiang and Tibet and the mainland, so that they will have to rely on the mainland after independence.

Ethnic issues are difficult to deal with. To be honest, I don't know what to do with the Xinjiang issue, so I generally don't hold a position.

Quote:
The Dalai Lama fled that year because he thought that the Tibetan areas in the four provinces were also Tibet. He was frightened by the people's commune movement there and thought that the CCP would tear up the agreement to deal with him. Now when overseas Tibetans mention Tibet independence, it also means that all Tibetan areas are combined into one country for independence. If you only allow the Tibet Autonomous Region to become independent, leaving the Tibetan areas in the four provinces in your hands will only continue the conflict between the Tibetans and the Han. It would be better not to be independent if this is the case, let the Tibet Autonomous Region has a high degree of autonomy.

Quote:
After democratization, which party dares to make Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other regions independent, and awakens the historical scars of China's fragmentation and be bullying, so there is no need to choose...

After democratization, it is also possible to oppose independence. Take Spain and Ukraine for example. Besides, even if they are independent, do you think you can eliminate hatred once and for all?
I'm afraid there are many more enemy countries nearby in an instant. Foreign forces enter these new countries, and then militants run in to play suicide bombings...

The most effective solution is to help them financially, and to use popular culture instead of Han culture to influence them and replace extreme religious consciousness.


Thread F:
Quote:
Now I want to ask: why didn't Western officials speak for our Han people? Why not accuse genocide against our Han people?

Quote:
Uyghur killing Han is called resisting tyranny, while Han killing Uyghur is called genocide :lol:

Quote:
Foreign countries have talked about China's human rights issues for so many years, from family planning, the August 9th school boom to Hong Kong, which incident victim is not Han? Foreign countries pay a lot of attention to Han people.

Quote:
I suggest reading more foreign media reports on the Kunming incident in 2014. Will foreigners really care about the human rights of the Chinese people? How to say that, Americans hate Chinese and Americans hate Muslims, but Americans especially like Chinese Muslims


Thread G:
Quote:
Before the Uighur large-scale indiscriminate attacks on the Han people, China had not persecuted the Uyghur people. After the large-scale terrorist attacks, all changed, and the CCP's means became increasingly cruel.

What I can't figure out is that independence is actually a trivial matter. Tibet has ask independent for so long, why the concentration camps are in Xinjiang, and why the terrorism in Xinjiang has become stronger and larger since the 1980s. This is the most important thing to think about.

Quote:
Because in the Qur'an, Chapter 8, verse 55, "in the eyes of Allah, the worst animals are unbelievers. They are unbelievers."

Thread H:
Quote:
Let's put it this way. With the argument of OP, if today's vote is OP vs Xi

I would rather vote for Xi or abandon the vote than give it to you.


Thread I:
Quote:
Simply put, you just indulge in your Virgin Mary fantasy, in which the Han people play the role of sludge and the ethnic minorities play the role of lotus leaves.
However, few of your lotus leaf ethnic minorities are actually easy to get along with.
After all, this kind of thing about slaughtering Han is not only under the CCP, nor is it unique to Xi coming to power.
(of course, you won't admit that you are trapped in the fantasy of Virgin Mary. After all, your ethnic hatred against Han people by Uighurs is regarded as "just" and "CCP", and the self-defense and counterattack speech of Han people is described as "climax")

Note: OP described the undifferentiated attack of Uighurs on Han civilians as "harm to CCP" before editing.
Quote:
Uighurs did no harm to CCP at all. They killed ordinary Han people.

As long as Muslims really have an advantage, according to the doctrine, they are going to clean up these "beasts" of the Han people.


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Cover your eyes, if you like. It will serve no purpose.

You might expect to be able to crush them in your hand, into wolf-bone fragments.
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30 Jul 2022, 4:34 am

@skinned wolf

If this is really propaganda then why do Chinese authorities in this region restrict/arrest foreign journalists effectively preventing outside reporting on the military activities in the region? If they want the rumours and allegation to stop they will have to be more transparent and be allow journalists to talk to the muslims in this region.

China's claim about stamping out terrorism is really not much more justified than Russia's invasion of Chechinya.



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30 Jul 2022, 4:44 am

cyberdad wrote:
@skinned wolf

If this is really propaganda then why do Chinese authorities in this region restrict/arrest foreign journalists effectively preventing outside reporting on the military activities in the region? If they want the rumours and allegation to stop they will have to be more transparent and be allow journalists to talk to the muslims in this region.

China's claim about stamping out terrorism is really not much more justified than Russia's invasion of Chechinya.

A. I don't know the specific restrictions on journalists' activities in the local area. It seems to change over time.

B. CCP is definitely not innocent there.
(as I stated at the beginning and mentioned in my translation of the external network debate)
There must be over-boundary and controversial parts in the repression.
Western media reports are not entirely wrong. It often interprets information only in an unbalanced or malicious way. Lies are part of the truth.

C. The most serious misunderstanding of the western media is that it deliberately omitted the long-standing and frequent indiscriminate attacks against civilians there.
Some of them are not unpublic or had reported. But they are (deliberately) forgotten.
BBC report on Kunming in 2014. It mentioned another attack inside Xinjiang.


On the one hand, information control is the CCP's controversial means to cover up their long-term existence in the local area. On the one hand, in order to prevent other Chinese people from discriminating against Uighurs because of local violence.
The CCP will actually control the information of all violent scenes that cause panic. No matter which side it comes from, even if it is actually virtual.


I think I wrote it very clearly. Read what I had written please.
I have noticed that your participation is often irrelevant to what I have already said.

The framework needed for the debate here is "whether the CCP's ethnic policy and the means of suppressing extreme violence are appropriate." or how to correctly deal with an ethnic conflict with extreme violence.
If we only start with the narrative of "a pitiful and somehow persecuted ethnic group", there will be no effective results here.

In addition, please define "China's claim". The Chinese authorities and a anti-CCP Chinese community are completely different things.


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Last edited by SkinnedWolf on 30 Jul 2022, 5:10 am, edited 1 time in total.

cyberdad
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30 Jul 2022, 5:10 am

SkinnedWolf wrote:
The framework needed for the debate here is "whether the CCP's ethnic policy and the means of suppressing extreme violence are appropriate." or how to correctly deal with an ethnic conflict with extreme violence.


You complicate a simple issue. The expatriate Uyghur population contradict your claims "there are no Xinjiang atrocities"

The CCP only have to allow foreign journalists to enter the region and talk to the minorities. If they have nothing to hide about abusing or worse, genocide against the Uygher then BBC, CNN, VICE, Al Jazeera and other news networks stay in this region and report. This simple act will resolve this issue.



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30 Jul 2022, 5:16 am

cyberdad wrote:
SkinnedWolf wrote:
The framework needed for the debate here is "whether the CCP's ethnic policy and the means of suppressing extreme violence are appropriate." or how to correctly deal with an ethnic conflict with extreme violence.


You complicate a simple issue. The expatriate Uyghur population contradict your claims "there are no Xinjiang atrocities"

The CCP only have to allow foreign journalists to enter the region and talk to the minorities. If they have nothing to hide about abusing or worse, genocide against the Uygher then BBC, CNN, VICE, Al Jazeera and other news networks stay in this region and report. This simple act will resolve this issue.

CCP claims there is "10". BBC claims there is "100".

The anti-CCP chinese community active in the external network believes that there are "30-70".
Some people believe that in order to curb local problems, appear for some reason, "50" is needed, which will not be tolerated by "civilized society". But this is not "atrocities/genocide".

It is likely to seriously cross the boundary, but the extent is unknown at present. (due to the information blockade on Xinjiang, I need to constantly check this point to find more internal information. The problem is that given the existence of multiple political agendas, we do not know which sources can be fully trusted.)
But not carrying out it at all is an absolute atrocity against other local ethnic groups. The families of the local Han victims would likely to have more extreme behavior.

However, for those parts that cross the border, transparent information may help Xinjiang residents. If the Chinese authorities and Chinese people can trust that the west is really concerned about human rights. After all, Westerners don't care about the known massacres against the Han.

By the way, the Chinese Anti CCP community has made high comments on the views of this guy in the English community.
Quote:
First we need to convince China that we really care about human rights.

Until now most countries have chosen profits over human rights at ever single turn.

On top of that leaders like Trump have shown approval for Uyghur camps: https://apnews.com/article/63f156933a5520d157dea25ab764af09

There is also a US led coalition to boycott Chinese high tech companies like Huawei.

All this caused the Chinese leadership to think that no one actually cares about human rights. But that they want to keep China in the middle income trap and the outrage about the camps is just one of the ways to demonise China.

So to convince China, most countries should put human rights as priority number 1. Some countries like the US need to clean house and lead by example. (reduce prison population, close ICE camps, do something about police violence and school shootings)

Then we can offer help to China to deal with its problems in a humane way.

The Chinese government struggled with separatism, religious radicalisation and domestic terrorism. Their current solution of camps and forced assimilation is not the best solution and will lead to resentment and more terrorism in the future. We have to help them solve these problems in a humane way.


_________________
With the help of translation software.

Cover your eyes, if you like. It will serve no purpose.

You might expect to be able to crush them in your hand, into wolf-bone fragments.
Dance with me, funeralxempire. Into night's circle we fly, until the fire enjoys us.